University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

University of Denver Sturm College of Law

2014

The Jewish Law Firm: Past and Present
Eli Wald

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
HLS Center on the Legal Profession Research Paper No. 2015-9

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

The Jewish Law Firm: Past and Present
Publication Statement
Copyright held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.

This paper is available at Digital Commons @ DU: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub/28

THE JEWISH LAW FIRM: PAST AND PRESENT
Eli Wald 1
I. Introduction
The rise and growth of large Jewish law firms in New York City during the second
half of the twentieth century is nothing short of an astounding success story. 2 As late as
1950, there was not a single large Jewish law firm in town. By the mid-1960s, six of the
largest twenty law firms were Jewish, and by 1980, four of the largest ten law firms were
Jewish firms. 3 Moreover, the accomplishment of these Jewish firms is especially striking
because, while the traditional large White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (“WASP”) law firms
also grew at a fast rate during this period, the Jewish firms grew twice as fast, and they
did so in spite of explicit discrimination.
What happened? This chapter studies the rise and growth of large New York City
Jewish law firms. It does so on the basis of the public record, with respect to both the law
firms themselves and trends in the legal profession generally, and through more than
twenty in-depth interviews with lawyers who either founded and practiced at these
successful Jewish firms, attempted and failed to establish such firms, or were in a
position to join these firms but decided instead to join WASP firms. 4

One generic 5 explanation is that Jewish law firms rose as the result of changes in

1

Charles W. Delaney Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.A., Tel-Aviv
University; L.L.B., Tel-Aviv University; L.L.M., Harvard Law School (waived); S.J.D., Harvard Law
School. This chapter is based on an article previously published in Eli Wald, “The Rise of the Jewish Law
Firm or Is the Jewish Law Firm Generic?” UMKC Law Review 76 (2008): 885–938.
2
See Part III.A below for a defin ition of a Jewish law firm.
3
See Tables 1 and 2 below, Part III.C.
4
These interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity; thus, any identifying information is
excluded, with interviewees referred to as “informants” and each assigned a number for the purposes of this
chapter. The transcripts of the interviews are on file with the author.
5
The term “generic” here borro ws fro m Tho mas Sowell, “Are Jews Generic?” in Black Rednecks and
White Liberals (New York: Encounter Books, 2005), 76–122. In his usual provocative style, Sowell argues
that hatred and persecution of Jews are generic in the sense that they have nothing to do with Jews per se.
Rather, Jews are the classic “middleman minorit ies,” despised and discriminated against on account of the
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cultural values and market conditions in American society after World War II, which saw
a gradual decline in anti-Semitism and religious-based discrimination against Jews in
America and an increased demand for legal services by large corporate clients. 6 This
account is generic in the sense that inherently it has nothing to do with Jewish law firms
and Jewish lawyers, and, indeed, it intrinsically has nothing to do with Jews or with the
legal profession itself. Rather, the decline of discrimination generally benefits minorities
and in the context of the legal profession it benefited Jewish law firms and Jewish
lawyers. Similarly, increased demand for corporate legal services benefited all law firms
and led to the rise and growth of large law firms, including Jewish law firms. The generic
explanation thus suggests that the reasons for the rise of the Jewish law firms were nonlegal; that is, they were to be found outside of the legal realm, and were not uniquely
Jewish. The success of the Jewish law firms was nothing more than a n example of the
consequences of more general trends—the decline of discrimination and increased
demand for legal services.
Yet, according to the informants interviewed in this chapter, Jewis h law firms were
not generic. While Jewish law firms certainly benefited from the decline in anti-Semitism
and increased demand for legal services, a unique combination of factors explains the
incredible rise of Jewish firms. First, white-shoe 7 ethos caused large WASP firms to stay
out of “undignified” practice areas and effectively created pockets of “Jewish” practice
intermediary ro le they play between producers and consumers as well as their distinctive social patterns.
Sowell concludes: “While there are characteristics and achievements which are uniquely Jewish, the history
of middleman minorit ies around the world seems to suggest that it has not been these uniquely Jewish
characteristics which called forth venomous hatreds but characteristics and achievements common to
middleman minorities. However unique [Jews] may be, historically the kind of hostility and hatred they
have faced has been generic” (121–22). To be clear, I accept neither Sowell's conclusions regarding Jews in
his essay nor the general themes in his book regarding the inferior cultural sensibilities of African Americans. I do, however, find instructive his use of “generic” and utilize it to draw a distinction between,
on the one hand, generic non-legal and non-uniquely Jewish reasons and, on the other hand, legal and
uniquely Jewish e xp lanations that account for the rise of the Jewish law firms.
6
See Parts IV and V belo w.
7
The phrase “white-shoe” originally referred to elite college males who wore wh ite buckskin shoes at Ivy
League schools in the 1950s, and is used to describe law firms in A merica that were populated by members
of the WASP elite and generally excluded anyone who was not a WASP male. See Elizabeth Chambliss,
“The Shoe Still Fits,” Legal Affairs 10 (2005): 18– 19.
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areas where the Jewish firms encountered little competition for their services. Second,
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices by the large WASP firms helped create a
large pool of talented Jewish lawyers from which the Jewish firms could easily recruit.
Finally, the Jewish firms benefited from a “flip side of bias” phenomenon, that is, they
benefited from the positive consequences of stereotyping. 8
This chapter proceeds in eight parts. Parts II and III set up the discussion. Part II
offers a brief history of the practice of law in New York City between the late nineteenth
and the mid-twentieth centuries, highlighting the emergence of large WASP law firms
and the existence of a lower stratum Jewish bar. Part III defines the notion of the Jewish
law firm and documents the rise and growth of these firms. Parts IV and V investigate the
“generic” trends within the American society and legal market that explain in part the
remarkable success of the Jewish law firms. Specifically, Part IV explores the
consequences of the decline of anti-Semitism and religious-based discrimination on
Jewish law firms and Part V studies the impact of increased client demand for corporate
services. Part VI examines a combination of unique factors that explain the growth of the
Jewish firms: the existence of protected Jewish pockets of practice, the surprising
consequences of effective WASP discrimination against Jewish lawyers and the effects of
the “flip side of bias” phenomenon. Following a conclusion in Part VII, Part VIII is an
appendix providing a methodological summary of the interviews that inform the analysis
in this chapter.

II. A Brief History of the Practice of Law in New York City
A. Large Law Firms in New York City, 1900–1950
The large law firm emerged as a new unit of law practice around the turn of the

8

See Part VI belo w.

twentieth century. 9 This type of firm's organizational structure, often referred to as the
Cravath System, featured six characteristics: a hierarchical structure based on two distinct
types of attorneys (partners and associates); close working relationships among firm
attorneys, emphasizing teamwork as opposed to individual work product; investment in,
and development of, candidate recruitment procedures followed by systematic training
programs for associates; a probation period for associates, followed by promotion to
partnership for some and an “up-or-out” policy for those not promoted; specialization of
individual attorneys' expertise and departmentalization of work within the firm based on
groupings of individual attorneys; and utilization of technology. 10 By the 1920s, the
Cravath System dominated the expanding world of large law firms, 11 and by the 1960s

9

See Magali S. Larson, “On the Nostalgic View of Lawyers' Role,” Stanford Law Review 37 (1985): 448
(“It is well known that the large law firm was born in the last third of the nineteenth century in a period of
institutional reorganizat ion.”); Wayne K. Hobson, “Symbol of the New Profession: Emergence of the Large
Law Firm, 1870– 1915,” in The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War America, ed. Gerald W.
Gawa lt (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 3 (“The legal profession . . . was transformed between the
1870s and the 1920s . . . Although most lawyers in 1930 still practiced alone or with one partner, the
leaders of the profession were no longer men in such firms; they were now all in large firms.” ). See,
generally, Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law
Firm (Ch icago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 4. “Large” has a dynamic meaning. According to
James Willard Hurst, “No firms of large membership appeared, even in the great cities, until the end of the
[nineteenth] century. The typical partnership was a two-man affair” (The Growth of American Law
[Boston: Little Brown, 1950], 306). The benchmark for “large” reached fifty attorneys by the 1950s; see
Erwin O. Smigel, “The Impact of Recruit ment on the Organization of the Large Law Firm,” American
Sociological Review 25 (1960): 58. By the late 1980s, “a firm of 50 members probably would not be
considered large” in major cities (Justin A. Stanley, “Should Lawyers St ick to Their Last?,” Indiana Law
Journal 64 [1989]: 473). In August 2007, the largest law firm in the world was Baker & McKenzie, with a
total of 3535 attorneys. See Lindsay Fortadoa, “Dewey Ballantine, LeBoeuf Agree to Merge Law Firms,”
Washington Post, August 28, 2007. Since 2008, restructuring in the market for corporate legal services and
the Great Recession halted the growth of large A merican law firms. See Marc Galanter and William
Henderson, “The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformat ion of the Big Law Firm,” Stanford Law
Review 60 (2008): 1867–1929; Eli Wald, “Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession,”
Fordham Law Review 78 (2010): 2051–66; Bernard A. Burk and David McGo wan, “Big but Brittle:
Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Econo my,” Columbia Business Law
Review (2011): 1–117; Eli Wald, “Smart Gro wth: The Large Law Firm in the Twenty -First Century,”
Fordham Law Review 80 (2012): 2867–2915.
10
See Eli Wald, “The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms,” Stanford Law Review 60 (2008):
1806–10. See, generally, Galanter and Palay, Tournament of Lawyers, 4–19.
11
See Wayne K. Hobson, The American Legal Profession and the Organizational Society 1890–1930 (New
Yo rk: Garland Publishing, 1986), 201. By the 1920s the system Cravath had initiated was well established
and regularized. The managing clerks of the leading law firms had even entered into a gentlemen's
agreement after World War I to eliminate the practice of co mpetit ive bidding for the services of the most
promising law school graduates. They established uniform beginning salaries and agreed not to pirate
emp loyees away fro m each other.

large firms reached their “Golden Era”12 in terms of being recognized as the elite of the
American legal profession. 13
Wall Street, New York City was essentially the birth-place of the large law firm.14
During the first half of the twentieth century Wall Street housed not only Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, the paradigmatic large firm, but also a significant number of all large
American law firms. In 1948, there were 284 law firms in the United States with eight or
more partners, located in fifty-seven different cities, with New York City accounting for
seventy-three of them. From 1950 through 1970, at least eight of the ten largest firms in
the country were New York City firms. 15 Indeed, until the 1970s, due to the concentration
of large law firms in New York City, the terms large “American” and “New York City”
law firms could be used interchangeably. 16 Moreover, the impact of New York City on
the rise and growth of large law firms was not limited to the mere number of firms it
hosted and its role as a key business and financial center, which enabled the Wall Street
firms to rise to dominance; rather, Wall Street itself emerged as the symbolic home of the
large firms—the new legal elite. 17
The large law firm reflected a new professional ideology significantly different from
the era's prevailing notions of lawyering. It purported to be a meritocracy in which hiring

12

Galanter and Palay, Tournament of Lawyers, 20.
Robert L. Nelson, Partners with Power: The Social Transformation of the Large Law Firm (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988). Nelson describes the large law firm as sitting “atop the pyramid of
prestige and power within the American legal profession. Altho ugh comprising but a small fraction of
lawyers, through its impact on patterns of recruit ment, styles of practice, and the collective institutions of
the bar, the large law firm has a significance that far exceeds the number of lawyers it employs ” (1).
14
According to Galanter and Palay, large firms grew in size, first in New York City, then in other large
cities, then in smaller cities, then overseas (Tournament of Lawyers, 14, 18–19).
15
Robert L. Nelson, “Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large Law Firms,”
American Bar Foundation Research Journal 6 (1981): 104. For a discussion of the growth of large law
firms outside of New York City, see Hobson, American Legal Profession and the Organizational Society
1890–1930, 163–88.
16
By the late 1970s, New York City lost its dominance as large law firms grew nation -wide. By 1979, all
but Shearman & Sterling had been displaced on the largest law firms list by the largest firms of other cities.
See below note 93.
17
See, e.g., David T. Bazelon, “Portrait of a Business Generalist,” Comment 24 (1960): 279 (“There is a
nice vignette to be written about the popular displacement in the past few decades of the historic phrase
‘Philadelphia lawyer’ by the new and more magical ‘New York lawyer.”’).
13

and promotion were based upon performance, replacing traditional notions of nepotism,
privilege, and class hierarchies. In 1920 Paul Cravath put this change into words as he
advised his hearers that for success at the New York bar “family influence, social
friendships and wealth count for little.” He further emphasized the large number of
successful lawyers who had come to New Yo rk from small places and “worked up from
the bottom of the ladder without having any advantage of position or acquaintance.”18
In spite of their claim to meritocracy, however, large New York City law firms
recruited and promoted almost exclusively WASP attorneys and featured a white-shoe
Protestant culture. 19 Jewish attorneys were rarely recruited and even less commonly
promoted to partnership. 20 Thus, the large New York City law firm club circa 1950
consisted entirely of WASP white-shoe law firms. 21

B. Jewish Lawyers in New York City, 1900–1950
The large law firm rose against a backdrop of a changing legal profession. In 1885
there were about 5,000 lawyers in New York City, about 400 of whom were Jewish. 22
The new century brought waves of immigrants and growth to the New York Bar. The
years between 1890 and 1910 witnessed an immense growth in part time and evening
programs in law schools, as well as great growth in the number of lawyers born abroad or

18

Robert T. Swaine, The Cravath Firm and its Predecessors: 1819–1947 (New York: Ad Press, 1948),
265. Similarly, Arthur Dean of Su llivan & Cro mwell opined: “ In today's larger legal partnerships
advancement is by and large by competence alone. Those who achieve positions of influence and
leadership in such firms tend to be those who have manifested their ability to relate into a more
comprehensive picture diverse fields of specializat ion and to view the major problems of client s in a broad
social perspective” (Arthur H. Dean, William Nelson Cromwell 1854–1948: An American Pioneer in
Corporation, Comparative and International Law [New York: Ad Press, 1957], 85).
19
See Wald, “Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms,” 1810–25, wh ich explo res the apparent
contradiction between the large law firm's meritocratic claim and its religious and cultural identity.
20
Note, “The Jewish Law Student and New Yo rk Jobs: Discriminatory Effects in Law Firm Hiring
Practices,” Yale Law Journal 73 (1964): 626, 635.
21
See Part VI belo w.
22
Henry W. Taft, Legal Miscellanies: Six Decades of Changes and Progress (New York: Macmillan, Co.,
1941), 77.

with foreign-born parents. 23 The newcomers crowded the lower stratum of the bar,
competing fiercely for clients and a livelihood. 24 Top educational credentials served as
barriers to exclude these unwelcome newcomers. 25 Indeed, “barriers to access became
more formidable as the desirability of access increased . . . [and] professional opportunity
depended upon ethnic, social, religious, and educational credentials.” 26 In this formative
era of the New York City legal profession, “Cromwells and Cravaths rose to the top;
‘Hebrews’ sank to the bottom.”27
Both trends—the growth of the bar and the increased stratification—continued to
dominate the New York City legal profession even after 1950, so much so that “in 1960,
there were approximately 26,000 lawyers in Manhattan and the Bronx, about 20,500 of
whom were active practitioners,” and 17,000 of whom were in private practice. 28 The
city's bar was almost all native-born white males, and was slightly over sixty percent
Jewish. 29 At the same time, ethnic- and religious-based discrimination (intertwined with
socio-economic-cultural bias) in the large law firm segment of the New York City bar
became common knowledge. 30 Moreover, “Jewish lawyers [were] less likely than their
non-Jewish colleagues to gain access to the high-status position in the bar.” 31 While they
constituted sixty percent of the New York City Bar, Jewish lawyers were overly
represented in individual practice (seventy-seven percent) and small firms (seventy-six

23

Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America (New Yo rk:
Oxford Un iversity Press, 1976), 95– 96.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., 95– 101.
26
Ibid., 25.
27
Ibid., 26.
28
Jero me E. Carlin, Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1966), 11.
29
Ibid., 18– 19.
30
“The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs,” 635 (“Gentiles were mo re successful than Jews in
getting good jobs, and in getting the jobs of their choice.”).
31
Carlin, Lawyers’ Ethics, 22.

percent), and significantly under-represented in large law firms (twenty- five percent). 32

C. New York, New York
In the first half of the twentieth century Wall Street was the center of corporate law
practice and had a larger concentration of large law firms than anywhere else in the
country and the world. New York City was also where the large Jewish law firm emerged
after 1950. 33 It is important to note, however, that the rise of the WASP firms, and
subsequently the Jewish firms, was not restricted geographically to New York City and
took place in other large metropolises; first in Chicago, Washington, D.C., Boston, and
Philadelphia, later expanding to the west coast, and eventually spreading to many large
cities throughout the United States. 34
Nonetheless, the informants suggest that both the rise of Jewish law firms and the
success of Jewish lawyers were due, at least in part, to the unique professional and
cultural conditions present in New York City. For example, describing the ideology and
approach of the New York City Bar Association, an informant observed:

It's sort of like the legal conscience of the world. There is no subject the New York
City Bar, a city, local bar association will not comment on, anything, human rights
in China. The City Bar has a very expansive notion of its jurisdiction. And I went to
the meetings of the House of Delegates for the New York State Bar because it's
such an extraordinarily interesting social institution. And New York is almost a
microcosm of the country. [On the other hand] I've never been active in the ABA,
it's just too big for me, too monolithic. 35
A partner at a large Jewish firm captured the interplay between cultural and
professional conditions in New York City and its impact on the practice of law:

32

Ibid., 28. Protestants attorneys, on the other hand, who constituted only about eighteen percent of the bar,
accounted for forty-three percent of the large law firm pool, and only nine percent of the individual
practitioner pool.
33
See Part III.C below.
34
See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, F. Daniel Frost and the Rise of the Modern American Law Firm (Tucson:
The University of Arizona, 2011) (on the transformation of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher fro m a Califo rniabased regional to a global law firm).
35
Informant #12, 17–18.

A Shomer Shabbas [Sabbath observer] attorney will work Saturday night or Sunday
to make up the time. In almost all cases, it doesn't upset the work flow at all. . . . A
number of times in my career, I had to impose on other attorneys to take over on a
Friday or Yom Tov [a day of religious observance], and it is even more difficult for
a day or a few days. I always feel uncomfortable when . . . imposing on somebody
to do that. Sometimes clients have to understand what's going on, especially if you
are not a New Yorker and they don't quite understand what it is all about. 36
Other informants explored the less obvious impact of New York City and its culture
on the rise of Jewish law firms. For instance, one informant said :

That is partly America, partly New York, which is very polyglot and we hardly
realize it, but you accept it and you only recognize it when someone comes from
outside of New York and step[s] in a subway and [is] startled by the multiple
nationalit[ies] and races and everything, which we take completely for granted. 37

Another informant described the present impact of New York culture with the
following remarks:

For sure, New York City has always, in my judgment, been more progressive and is
more progressive today- liberal or progressive-call it what you will, in accepting . . .
diversity than places in the Midwest . . . I'm sure New York is way ahead. I know,
from personal experience, that when it comes to prejudice against women . . . there
are firms in the Midwest that are back where [New York was] thirty years ago. . . .
Five or ten years ago, one of the major firms [down south] had a “wet t-shirt”
contest at their summer outing . . . I remember reading about that and saying, “Are
they in the Middle Ages?” I mean, there's no way a thing like that could happen at .
. . any New York City law firm. We're just ahead. 38

III. The Meaning of a Jewish Firm
A. The Jewishness of the Jewish Firms

In this chapter, a Jewish law firm refers to a firm whose majority of lawyers, both
partners and associates, between 1950 and 1980 were Jewish. While there is no precise
record of the religious affiliation of their attorneys, law firms were commonly known as
36

Informant #6, 13.
Informant #4, 17.
38
Informant #5, 13.
37

WASP, Jewish, Catholic, or mixed. For instance, one informant stated, “In those days, I
think, there were some Jewish firms—predominant Jewish firms—and non-Jewish
firms.”39 Another informant labeled a specific firm “a Jewish firm,” adding, “The counsel
of the firm was James Marshall, son of Louie Marshall. The make- up was really Jewish.
That firm was still . . . a Jewish firm. It might have had non Jewish [assoc iates] but all of
the partners were Jewish.”40
By a “Jewish” firm, I do not mean to suggest that such a firm featured a unique
Jewish firm culture, any specific Jewish values, professional or otherwise, or any
commitment to or knowledge of Jewish law. 41 In fact, the Jewish firms were Jewish by
discriminatory default; namely, due to the discriminatory hiring and promotion practices
at the elite WASP firms, many Jewish attorneys flocked to the “Jewish” firms, thus
constituting these firms as Jewish. 42
In theory, Jewish law firms could have developed as institutions organized around
Jewish themes, values, and culture. 43 One can imagine, for example, law firms with a
special commitment to the notion of doing mitzvahs (i.e., good deeds) in the form of
enhanced pro bono. 44 An informant postulated that Jewish firms, or at least Jewish
partners, could build on the affinity between Jewish law and American law and use the

39

Informant #6, 6.
Informant #2, 5, 8.
41
In contrast, WASP firms did have a uniquely Protestant identity, coupled with a wh ite-shoe cultural
identity. See Wald, “Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms,” 1810– 25.
42
See Part VI belo w.
43
On the relationship between faith and professional identity, see, generally, Tho mas L. Shaffer, Faith and
the Professions (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 1987); Marc Galanter, “A Vocat ion for Law?
American Jewish Lawyers and Their Antecedents,” Fordham Urban Law Journal 26 (1999): 1125– 47. On
the interplay between religious identity and professional identity, see Sanford Levinson, “Identifying the
Jewish Lawyer: Reflect ions on the Construction of Professional Identity,” Cardozo Law Review 14 (1993):
1577–1612; Martha Minow, “On Being a Relig ious Professional: The Religious Turn in Professional
Ethics,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150 (2001): 661– 68; Russell G. Pearce, “Reflect ions on
the American Jewish Lawyer,” Journal of Law & Religion 17 (2002): 179– 88.
44
Indeed, historically, Jewish law firms were known for their co mmit ment to pro bono work. Fo r examp le,
“The Scholarship and Defense Fund for Racial Equality (CORE SCDF) . . . was a mixed black and white
group . . . It fell apart with the rise of Black Power and tensions in New York City between Jews and
Blacks . . . Both Jews of World War II, and Israel and Blacks were all viewed as underdogs, and still
remain to this day. And so that was an outlet” (Informant #2, 10).
40

latter to instruct and introduce young Jewish students to the former. 45 To be clear,
however, Jewish law firms did not develop such a Jewish identity. While many Jewish
lawyers were actively involved with Jewish causes, their support was usually rendered in
their personal capacity outside of their legal practice rather than in their professio nal
capacity as lawyers. Judaism did not emerge as a central organizational theme or
underlying professional value. For instance, one informant recalled :

When I was interviewed [by a large Jewish firm,] I mentioned that I was a Sabbath
observer; the person who interviewed me wanted to know what that was although
he was
Jewish. . . . I explained it to him [and] . . . he said, “Just work your tail off we don't
care when it is and that will be that.”46

Another informant noted:

Being [observant] was much more of a problem in terms of these [Jewish] firms
than just the mere fact that you were Jewish or Catholic, from my point of view. I
remember being interviewed in well-established Jewish firms. One I can remember
now the partner who interviewed me was a Shomer Shabbat [Sabbath observer]
himself and he told me that it would be a mistake for me to come there because of
the hard time he had. And then going to another firm the guy said to me, “well,
you're going to have to go home early on Friday.” Kind of put me in that kind of a
corner. And I was interviewed by some big [Jewish] firms. But it was more . . . like
a courtesy, I think, everybody was just going through the motions. 47

The informant went as far as to characterize practice realities at the Jewish firms as
discriminatory vis-à-vis observant Jewish attorneys, noting:

45

The informant believes that, currently, Jewish law and legal studies inform and enhance each other:
“Certainly today it [referring to the synergy between Jewish and legal studies] does . . . I think it's a
tremendous thing to teach kids [today], to show the roots when you're teaching a high school class because
they're smart kids, you know, they're in h igh school already to teach them that the roots of law in the Un ited
States, where law's derived fro m is fascinating it helps strengthen their belief in the Talmud and in the
Jewish tradit ion and their continuity and also, I think it's just fascinating” (Informant #15, 10). On the
affinity between Jews and American law, see generally, Jero ld S. Auerbach, Rabbis and Lawyers: The
Journey from Torah to Constitution (Bloo mington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
46
Informant #10, 3.
47
Informant #7, 1–3. Moreover, the same informant reported, “I'd say the lawyers I knew were kind of
single practitioners, kind of mo re my father's peers. And if they were observant they had to be single
practitioners because they couldn't get jobs anywhere else” (6). Another observant Jew, working for a large
Jewish firm believed that “I was the first Orthodox hired by a Jewish firm” (Informant # 14, 2).

I like to think of [an observant Jewish attorney with a large Jewish law firm] as a
role model except he came after me [graduating in 1958]. In my view, for whatever
it's worth, I think he's the guy who broke the glass ceiling [for observant Jewish
attorneys at Jewish firms] so far as many people were concerned. When he made
the success that he did make very quickly, it opened the door to Yeshiva graduates
who were observant. 48
Another informant describing the hiring patterns of Jewish law firms noted, “The
major Jewish law firms weren't hiring first or second generation Jews.”49 Other observant
informants, however, had a more pleasant experience interviewing with Jewish firms:

During the interviewing process [my religious observance] sometimes came up and
came up also to the effect that I would not work on Saturday. [At one interview]
someone said, ‘you're exactly what we want, I hope you'll work on Saturday when
we need you,’ and I told them, ‘no I won't work on Saturday.’ He said, ‘it won't
happen too often.’ I said, ‘no it won't work.’ So that was more of the negative type
of interview. In this firm, as in most of the [Jewish] firms, at least the spoken word
was that there would be no problem, that they would support the fact that I had to
leave early on Friday and not come in on Saturday. But sometimes you never know
until you get someplace. 50

Of course, some Jewish lawyers were not as ignorant of Jewish customs and habits,
yet they still chose not to emphasize their Jewish identity, let alone celebrate it as an
important component of their professional identity. 51 One informant witnessed this
behavior, stating:

I know people that are involved heavily in the Jewish federation . . . They got
involved in the 50's and the 60's and thought [that] to be involved in [the] federation
you should take off the Yarmulke when you go into the building. . . . It's interesting.
48

Informant #7, 6.
Informant #17, 17.
50
Informant #18, 6– 7.
51
That is not to suggest that Jewish identity, values , and experiences did not indirectly influence and shape
the professional culture and organization of Jewish firms. One informant, fo r examp le, d iscussing the
growth pattern of his firm, noted: “Probably the fundamental thing was, we were never sure where we
would be going and so on. When you start out, you can go one of two ways. One, you can sort of gamble
and keep expanding and so on. The other you can be very conservative and not take the next step until
you're sure you have the right base. All o f us were b asically very conservative people. We never felt that
confident that tomorro w would be there so that was probably fundamental” (Informant #17, 11). The same
informant further explained, “Well, keep in mind, we grew up during the Depression, we didn't come fro m
rich families, never sure that we were going to be that successful” (13).
49

Every once in a while Clinton used to say to me, “Rabbi . . . ” I insisted I didn't
want to be called Rabbi even though I was [a Rabbi] . . . I wanted them to know a
layman wears a Yarmulke. 52

In some instances, Jewish interests were outweighed by the desire for
professionalism and loyalty to clients' interests. A partner at a large Jewish law firm
described his firm's decision to open an office in Germany, despite the legacy of the
Holocaust, as follows:

Frankfurt is the center of business across Europe and if we were going to grow, we
had to be there, and our clients insisted that we go. We have clients that are very
active in the European markets and, you know, if you don't want to open, that's fine,
but we'll go elsewhere. 53

One can take opposite views regarding the Jewish reaction to post-Holocaust
Germany, ranging from opposition to opening an office in Germany to celebrating such
an office as a triumph over evil. What is significant about the informant's perspective is
that it reflects no Jewish consideration whatsoever. 54 The relevant issues were clients'
needs and the firm's competitiveness in global legal markets. 55

Certainly, Jewish firms employing nearly exclusively Jewish attorneys developed
some benefits from the homogeneous religious affiliation of their practitioners. An
attorney in a Jewish firm confirmed:

We had a . . . very nice firm. It was congenial. There were never any real problems
with rooms. Everybody kind of liked everybody else. I never brought up at a firm
meeting any issue unless I had first cleared it with most of the partners. It was
52

Informant #10, 13–14.
Informant #1, 9.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid. Similarly, another informant recalled a conversation in which he was told about a prominent Je wish
attorney representing a Congressional committee. On a Friday evening, a member of the committee asked
the attorney, “‘Mr. XXX, don't you have to go home?’ So I said, ‘Well what did Mr. XXX say?’ An d he
said [that Mr. XXX rep lied,] ‘Oh Mr. Senator, for matters of national security I'm permitted to violate the
Sabbath”’ (Informant #15, 22). Once again, client needs and professional identity took preceden ce over
personal identity and religious observance.
53

worth the time and the aggravation to persuade people, so there was never a hostile
vote taken or anything like that. 56

Moreover, at times, Jewish elements did impact the practice of law at the Jewish
firms. For example, an informant said of his Sabbath observance:

Many times when I leave on Friday, my non-Jewish partners and associates see me
leave . . . They see that advantage I have by having a strict regimen which can't be
violated. I have to say, it probably does give to me a psychological advantage over
many of the people who don't have that rest or can't count on the rest. 57

Similarly, another said of Yom Kippur observance:

So the joke around here was: there was a relatively senior lawyer, a partner in the
corporate department . . . a very devout Catholic . . . We called him the “house guy”
because the question was if he's good what is he doing here, why isn't he downtown
or something like that? He would call me every February. I'll never forget, every
February he'd say, “Yom Kippur, it’s six months from now.” I'd say, “Why do you
care?” and his answer was, “Well, the trouble is, I'm always setting meetings with
Jewish lawyers and they never think of these things and then suddenly we find
out—oh, the day before Yom Kippur—[they] can't come to the meeting [because]
it's Yom Kippur.”58

Also affecting the practice of law at the Jewish firms was a particular emphasis on
the pro bono commitments and extra-curricular activities of Jewish partners, as is noted
in the following:

At that time, there was no such thing as a program to go to Israel for a year after
high school. . . . In fact, some years later on, I helped to set that up, eventually.
That's a whole separate story. Someone now in Israel wanted to go, needed Jewish
Agency approval to get the money . . . I knew people at the Jewish Agency [who]
went to Israel, met with the appropriate people, but that's a different success story. 59
Another informant said of such extra-curricular involvement: “I got involved in the
Jewish Community Relations Council which is a bridge, kind of an umbrella over sixty
56

Informant #1, 9.
Informant #6, 15.
58
Informant #10, 2– 3.
59
Informant #4, 2.
57

different organizations and worked on the Committee [in various roles].” 60
Yet, unlike Black corporate firms, 61 Jewish law firms did not have a mission to
create lasting Jewish institutions. The Jewish firms were Jewish by discriminatory
default, and Judaism simply did not play a constitutive role in their organization and
professional identity. One informant's account of the role of Judaism in his life captures
the role Judaism played in many Jewish firms: “I have been interested in my Jewish
roots. I identify and am interested in the Jewish tradition and its scholarship and play
with that occasionally. I suppose it was Stendahl who said ‘life is love and work.’ And I
have been very happy in my marriage and my family and have been ge nerally very happy
in my work. And I continue to support humanitarian causes with hope if not with
optimism.” 62 While certainly mindful of his Jewish roots, Judaism for the informant was
separate and distinct from his work, something to “play with” after hours, something that
informs, in an indirect fashion, commitment to humanitarian causes. 63 Similarly, in many
Jewish firms and for many Jewish lawyers both at Jewish and at WASP firms, Judaism
was of interest, a source that informed pro bono and extra-curricular activities, and yet it
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Informant #2, 11. Another noted: “when you're a Jewish lawyer, you definitely get approached by, you
know, causes, working for legal services they figure will appeal to you, so you have that kind of work, so
certainly, you know synagogues” (Informant #15, 31).
61
See David Wilkins, “‘If You Can't Join ‘em Beat ‘em!’ The Rise and Fall of the Black Corporate Law
Firm,” Stanford Law Review 60 (2008): 1733–1801.
62
Informant #3, 91.
63
The separation between one's professional identity as an attorney and one's relig ious identity as a Jew
was likewise noted by several info rmants: “The people of my generation [following WWII and the
Holocaust] even if we were not personally touched, we were touched, so that has basically defined my
interests; I think that plus the fact that I was amb itious, I wanted to succeed, I worked hard, I did everything
I could to advance my position but I always fro m that time became touched by Jewish issues ” (Informant
#13, 6). Moreover, the same informant reported, “The religious identity was something that I developed as
time went by. My background, training, fro m schools and professional experiences [was different], relig ion
was not a part of it at all.” Another informant exp lained: “I would say that [my relig ious identity] was not
relevant to [my professional identity]. I mean, I am familiar with Jewish charities and such but I don't think
one had anything to do with the other” (Informant #19, 8). But for one info rmant, his Jewish identity,
culture, and experience did in form and shape the practice of law: “[My interest in immigrat ion law] was
sparked by my study of Jewish history. I have felt always . . . you know if you do a study of what went on
in the 1930s, the German quota was open at all times fo r immigration to the Un ited States and if you go
through the correspondence between the American Consul General in Berlin and his superiors in
Washington . . . you'll see that these anti-Semites said, ‘no Jews.’ So I felt that I could help people [in such]
circu mstances . . . and I have had the privilege over the years of doing a lot of such cas es” (Informant #20,
12– 13).

was independent of their “work,” the practice of law.
Another informant questioned, “it is hard [for a person] to separate religious identity
from other identities” and “I always tried to do the right thing. Is it [doing the right thing]
being Jewish?”64 Similarly he was uncertain about what it would mean for the firm to
have a Jewish identity, saying, “People like people they can deal with and feel they
know. So religion in that sense was relevant.” 65 But beyond such a sense of cultural
familiarity, he did not believe Judaism played a role in the organization, structure and
practice of the firm. 66

B. Who is a Jew?

The issue of defining Jewish identity is a highly controversial one. In the context of
characterizing law firms, even the basic definition of a Jewish firm as one that employed
a majority of Jewish attorneys is not without its challenges because no record lists
lawyers by their religious affiliation. That said, for the purposes of this chapter, such a
headcount is not necessary, nor is a “definite” list of all Jewish law firms of the era.
Instead, suffice it to note that commonly referred to Jewish law firms included
“traditional” Jewish law firms established before 1950 (such as Stroock & Stroock &
Lavan; Weil, Gotshal; Kaye, Scholer; Proskauer, Rose; Fried, Frank; and the Rosenman
firm) and “start- up” Jewish firms founded in the early 1960s (such as Schulte, Roth &
Zabel, and Kramer, Levin). 67 In addition, a group of mixed firms, never known as Jewish
law firms, existed with a significant contingency of Jewish attorneys, some “traditional”
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Informant #14, 2.
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
A partner at a start-up Jewish firm described his first few years of practice with an established mixed
firm as “happy years.” Along with colleagues fro m several other Jewish firms as well as fro m h is own firm,
he helped establish a somewhat less “traditional,” mo re “entrepreneurial” firm (Informant #16, 2–3).
65

(Paul, Weiss 68 and Cleary, Gottlieb 69 ), and others “start-up” (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz70 and Skadden, Arps 71 ).72

C. The Rise and Growth of the Jewish Law Firms

In 1950 the New York City elite corporate bar consisted of only well-established,
large law firms. Without exception, every member of the elite club was a WASP law
firm. Not a single member of the elite large law firm club was a Jewish firm; in fact,
there were no large Jewish firms in New York City. 73 This is not surprising given that
five years earlier, in 1945, not a single Jewish firm had more than ten lawyers. As one
68

The firm was formed in 1945 as Mr. Weiss and Mr. Wharton joined forces with Mr. Paul and M r.
Garrison. Unique not only in the heterogeneous relig ious affiliation of its named partners and attorneys,
Paul, Weiss was the first majo r Wall Street law firm to move to midtown (in 1949), the first to elect a
female partner (in 1946 at its D.C. office) and the first to hire a black associate. Judge Rifkind joined the
firm in 1950, and the firm enhanced its reputation as a leading lit igation law firm. By 1949, the firm had 13
lawyers; by 1970, the firm had 110 lawyers; and by 1972, it had 138. See Paul Hoffman, Lions in the
Street: The Inside Story of the Great Wall Street Law Firms (New Yo rk: Saturday Review Press, 1973),
112–21.
69
Cleary, Gottlieb was formed fo llo wing a split fro m Root Carter. “Most Jewish attorneys follo wed
Gottlieb to Cleary,” and Gottlieb became the first Jewish named partner in a major Wall Street law firm
(Hoffman, Lions in the Street, 65). The firm grew rapidly, fro m 17 attorneys as of December 31, 1946, to
27 lawyers four years later, and to 63 lawyers on December 31, 1960. See Leo Gottlieb, Cleary, Gottlieb,
Steen & Hamilton: The First Thirty Years (New York: The Firm, 1983), 76–77, 138.
70
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz was formed by four Jewish partners. Like Pau l, Weiss, Cleary, and
Skadden, Wachtell never developed a reputation as a Jewish firm, quickly earn ing a reputation as one of the
elite law firms in New York City and setting the mark for the highest paid associates and the highest
profits-per-partner. See Steven Brill, “Two Tough Lawyers in the Tender Offer Game,” New York
Magazine, June 21, 1976, at 55 (describing Skadden, Arps and Wachtell, Lipton as “younger firms, many
of which were started by Jewish lawyers who were not as welco me then at the old -line firms”). Wachtell
has maintained its reputation as a leader in p rofit-per-partner. See http://
www.abajournal.co m/weekly/skadden_wachtell_top_amlaw_ 100 (last visited July 10, 2013).
71
In 1963 Skadden, Arps had ten lawyers. By 1980, it had 205; and, by 2004, it was the second largest law
firm in New York City with over 1700 attorneys. Skadden, Arps never developed a reputation as a Jewish
firm, although many of its attorneys, including some of its founders, were Jewish. See Brill, “Two Tough
Lawyers in the Tender Offer Game,” 55. See, generally, Lincoln Cap lan, Skadden: Power, Money, and the
Rise of a Legal Empire (New York: Noonday Press, 1993).
72
One informant exp lained that while the “mixed” firms never developed a reputation for being “Jewish ,”
the Jewish firms, defined as recruiting and promoting almost exclusively Jewish attorneys, underwent
“Cravathization”; that is, over time they began to regularly recruit and promote the best talent, Jewish and
non-Jewish attorneys alike, to overcome and “get outside the characterization of a Jewish firm” (Informant
#16, 5). The sentiment is consistent with an account given by another informant, a partner at a mixed firm,
who explained that the hiring criteria at h is firm were always based on merit : “One of the reasons we
thought it was very important to hire out of law school is that we wanted people to sort of grow up with us”
(Informant #17, 15). See Part VII below.
73
In 1950, when the benchmark for a large firm was 50 lawyers, Weil, Gotshal was the largest Jewish law
firm with a total of 19 attorneys; Kaye, Scholer had 18; Paul, Weiss had 17; Proskauer, Rose had 15;
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan had 13; Fried, Fran k had 12; and the Rosenman firm had 7. See the
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (Su mmit, N.J.: Mart indale-Hubbell, 1950).

interviewee confirmed, “[There were no] Jewish firms . . . [in] the 50s. [The Jewish
firms] were very small firms . . . [One] existed with eight lawyers. 74
Table 1: Jewish Law Firms in New York City, 1932–1950 75
Firm Name
1932
Fried, Frank,
777
Harris, Shriver,
& Jacobson76
Weil, Gotshal & 3
Manges

1935
678

1940
879

1945
680

1950
1281

3

9

12 (+1
tax counsel)

Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen
& Hamilton82

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind,
Wharton &
Garrison84
Stroock &
Stroock &
Lavan
Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays
& Handler

4

4

4

485

18 (+1 in
Washington
, DC office)
6 (+1 in
Washington
, DC office,
+1 in Paris,
France
office) 83
16 (+1
counsel) 86

187

2

2

3

13

N/A

N/A

4

9

1888

74

Informant #8, 7.
Nu mbers are based on Martindale-Hubbell Directories for the years 1932 (the first year it was published)
and 1935 through 1950, at five-year intervals.
76
Fried, Fran k's predecessor was Limburg, Riegelman, Hess & Hirsch. Walter Fried joined the Riegleman
firm in the late 1930s or 1940.
77
Limburg, Riegelman, Hirsch & Hess. Walter Fried was apparently a solo practitioner.
78
Riegelman, Hirsch & Hess. Walter Fried was still apparently a solo practitioner.
79
Walter Fried was part of the firm by this time.
80
Riegelman, Strasser, Schwarz & Sp iegelberg.
81
H.J. Frank had joined the firm by this time. Frank was apparently in solo practice before his association
with the Riegelman firm.
82
See Hoffman, Lions in the Street, 62–63 (stating that Cleary, Gottlieb was formed in 1945 when George
Cleary and Leo Gottlieb left the well-established Root Clark firm).
83
Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly & Fo x.
84
Paul, Weiss grew out of the firm of Cohen, C (name could not be determined), Weiss & Wharton.
85
1932, 1935, 1940, and 1945 nu mbers all reflect Cohen, C, Weiss & Wharton. See Hoffman, Lions in the
Street, 112 (Paul, Weiss, Wharton & Garrison was formed in 1945 and had 13 lawyers).
86
By 1958, the firm had grown to fifty lawyers. See Hoffman, Lions in the Street, 45.
87
The firm was known as Stroock & Stroock until the 1940s. Peter I.B. Lavan, a .k.a. Peter I.B. Lev ine,
joined the firm in 1945 accord ing to Martindale-Hubbell Directory.
88
By 1958, the firm had grown to 43 lawyers. See Hoffman, Lions in the Street, 45.
75

Proskauer, Rose

889

7

9

Rosenman,
Goldmark 91

N/A

N/A

N/A

11 (+1
counsel) 90
N/A

14 (+1
counsel)
7

By the mid 1960s, however, this reality had changed significantly. Growing much
faster than the WASP firms, the Jewish firms had “caught up” with the WASP firms and
penetrated the elite law firm club, constituting six of the twenty largest law firms in New
York City. In less than a fifteen-year time span, Jewish law firms grew, as a group, at an
average of 200%, with Fried, Frank and Paul, Weiss growing by 400% and Kaye, Scholer
by 375%. To be sure, WASP firms also grew at an impressive rate. As a group, however,
WASP firms grew at 50% the rate of Jewish firms, averaging about 100%. This trend of
faster growth continued between 1963 and 1980, and by 1980 Jewish firms accounted for
four of the ten largest firms in New York City. WASP firms also grew at an impressive
rate; however, except for Shearman & Sterling, all of the WASP firms grew by less than
100% during this time. 92
Table 2: New York City Large Law Firms 93
Firm Name
Shearman & Sterling

89

1950
31

1963
134

1981
335

Proskauer, Rose & Paskus.
Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn.
91
Hoffman indicates this was another of the “Jewish giants” (Lions in the Street, 33). Its predecessors were
Rosenberg, Go ld mark & Colin (Martindale-Hubbell, 1932) and Gold mark, Colin & Kaye (MartindaleHubbell, 1945). By 1950, it was known as Rosenman, Go ld mark, Co lin & Kaye. In 1973, when Lions in
the Street was published, it was known as Rosenman, Colin, Kaye, Petschek, Freund & Emil.
92
Informat ion in the preceding paragraph regarding the largest New Yo rk City law firms be tween 1963 and
2006 was collected using the following sources: “Growth of 20 Large Law Firms -1963–1981,” New York
Law Journal, Mar. 16, 1981, 3; “National Law Firm Survey,” National Law Journal, Sept. 18, 1978, 14–
17; “National Law Firm Survey,” National Law Journal, Oct. 6, 1980, 32–37; “The NLJ 250,” National
Law Journal, Sept. 30, 1985, S4–S18; “The NLJ 250,” National Law Journal, Sept. 24, 1990, S4S32; “The
20 Largest Firms Based in New York City,” New York Law Journal, Oct. 1, 1990, S3–S4; “The NLJ 250,”
National Law Journal, Oct. 9. 1995, C6–C22; “Top 25 New York City-Based Firms,” New York Law
Journal, Dec. 11, 2000, S20; “The NLJ 250,” National Law Journal, Nov. 15, 2004, S16–S27; “Top 25
New York City-Based Firms,” New York Law Journal, Dec. 13, 2004, 34 (“Growth of New Yo rk Law
Firms”).
93
The 1950 numbers are based on Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (1950). The 1963 and 1981 numbers
are based on “Growth of 20 Large Law Firms -1963–1981,” New York Law Journal, Mar. 16, 1981, 3.
90

Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom
Cravath, Swaine & Moore
Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver, & Jacobson
Davis, Polk & Wardwell
Weil, Gotshal & Manges

Coudert Brothers
Sullivan & Cromwell
Dewey, Ballantine,
Bushby, Palmer & Wood
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy

Simpson, Thacher &
Bartlett
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton

Cahill, Gordon & Reindel
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison
White & Case
Donovan, Leisure, Newton
& Irvine
Rogers & Wells
Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft
Stroock & Stroock &
Lavan
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hays & Handler

6

10

240

21
12

124
61

225
222

25
18 (+1 in
Washington,
DC office)
14 (+1 tax
counsel)
24
1694

112
42

221
220

40

218

113
121

216
212

26 (+1
Counsel, +1
in
Washington,
DC office)
21 (+1
Counsel)
6 (+1 in
Washington,
DC office,
+1 in Paris,
France
office)
18
16 (+1
Counsel)
27
20 (+1
Counsel)
1895
17

120

210

109

209

75

206

88
83

202
202

125
69

189
182

62
70

176
171

13

N/A

170

18

86

164

Two general trends taking place post-World War II explain, in part, the rise and
growth of the Jewish law firms: 1) a gradual decline in anti-Semitism and religious-based

94

In 1950 Dewey Ballantine was known as Root, Ballantine, Harlan, Bushby & Palmer. The firm had
sixteen lawyers.
95
In 1950, Rogers & Wells was known as Dwight, Royall, Harris, Koegel & Caskey. It had eighteen
lawyers. William Rogers joined in 1950. The firm became known as Rogers & Wells in the early 1970s.

discrimination that made it easier for Jewish law firms to expand their corporate client
base; and 2) an increased demand for legal services by corporate clients that exceeded the
capacity of the dominant WASP law firms and opened the door for other law firms,
including Jewish firms. While generally confirming the existence and consequences of
these twin trends, the informants' accounts in Parts IV and V shed light on how they
specifically contributed to and shaped the growth pattern of the Jewish firms.

IV: Diminished Discrimination and its Impact on the Growth of the Jewish Firm
A. Overall Decline in Anti-Semitism and Religious-Based Discrimination

Describing the prevailing discriminatory status quo in America in the years before
World War II and immediately after it, one informant recalled, “I went to work as an
engineer for a very brief time and I went to work for [a large engineering company] but
in those times [late 1940s], they did not hire Jews, and neither did anyone else,
engineering was not a Jewish profession.” 96 When asked about the decline in antiSemitism in American society beginning in the 1950s, one informant stated:

Well, it changed; the world changed it in several respects, I guess. People, I think,
the whole notion of anti-Semitism, of any ethnic discrimination . . . The society has
really progressed quite dramatically. Discrimination against Jews certainly in the
eastern part of the United States in major cities was dramatically less. 97

The decline of anti-Semitism and religious-based discrimination was a slow, gradual
process. Beginning in the 1950s and intensifying in the 1960s, the process reached its
culmination in the 1970s. One informant described the trend as follows:

Now remember in the late 60's, the world was beginning to open up with the
Vietnam War and so on, all the prejudices began to disappear, and certainly after
the Second World War the prejudices began to wear down the dam just broke,
96

Informant #21, 2.

97

Informant #5, 12.

because every institution was questioned. Every institution was questioned and the
young people, including me were questioning everything. And all the old rules
began to disappear. And somehow or other Jews began to be able to get into things,
and we got hired by clients. 98

Another informant opined,
The 70's was a time where I believe there was great openness generally and people
understood the need [for diversity,] whether they verbalized it or [not], . . . [and
that] they were losing out on talent by [not] exposing themselves to various types of
people. I think there was a general cultural change going on in the United States,
and I think there was a greater need for lawyers in the 70's and the 80's. That was a
time of huge growth in the law firms with [greater] need for lawyers, and I think
people recognized that they should be focusing on getting the best possible
lawyers. 99

The decline in discrimination, to be sure, centered on ethnic and religious grounds
and did not extend to the same degree to racial and gender considerations. One informant
remarked, “I think there is also some change in the country. America generally changed
in terms of the kinds of discrimination it was willing to practice, putting race aside.”100
One informant described how increased religious tolerance altered the practice of law
and, in particular, courtroom practices:

We were sitting down for the scheduling conference, depositions, Friday meeting or
something like that and he assigned the schedule and [the federal judge] said, “Oh
well we can't set that up because you need to leave early on Friday. ” I mean, he
knew every Jewish holiday, he knew because he had [a Jewish] law clerk and to
me, in 1960, this was like unbelievable. I had judges who would on a Friday
afternoon make me sit and wait and not let me go home until 3 o'clock even though
the case hadn't started, just to sit and wait. An Ita lian judge would say to me, “I
know when the sun sets!” Like I had to be home when the sun set and ten minutes
before would [not be a problem]. And one time I remember it was Friday and it was
Chanukah so you had to get home particularly early because you had to light
candles before Shabbat. And I said to my client, it was about 3 o'clock “I'm going
home. Anything happens, you just say ‘he had to leave.’” Today, you go into a
98

Informant #21, 6. The same informant further clarified : “Did I say this country has no discrimination
today? No obviously there still is. There are still places you can't go to play golf, places you can't buy a
house, but there are many more where you can” (16).
99
Informant #6, 10– 11.
100
Informant #4, 16– 17. See Elizabeth Chamb liss, “Organizat ional Determinants of Law Firm Integration,”
American University Law Review 46 (1997): 739–40. Chambliss cautions against the tendency to treat
wo men and racial minorities as a single, undifferentiated group.

judge and there's no issue. 101

Another informant opined that the slow yet gradual decline of racial-based discrimination
also benefited Jewish lawyers. 102
The impact of a decline in anti-Semitism and religious-based discrimination on
Jewish law firms was significant, making it more likely that corporate clients who
previously discriminated against Jewish law firms were subsequently more likely to
retain them. “I think it's a combination [of] two things,” an informant said, speculating
regarding the willingness of entity clients to hire Jewish firms. “I think it's a combination
of an overall decline in discrimination [and] a ‘rat race’ for the best lawyers.”103

Another informant described the combined effect of diminished discrimination and
increased reliance on merit-considerations:

About 14 years ago my firm was asked to represent a [financial institution] and [a
Jewish partner with the firm], who was probably the most respected banking lawyer
in the country was concerned that the client might not know that [he] was Jewish.
So, he got word to the client, the individual in the institution, that he wanted to
know that it was all right, or was he disturbed by the fact that he was Jewish,
because there were many other lawyers there. [The client] had been advised that he
wanted, that he needed and should have good legal representation. He couldn't get
better than [the Jewish partner]. That's what he cared about, to be well represented.
I really think that the focus on the merits of lawyering, [on] a la wyer's abilities has
overcome these stereotypes and prejudices. 104

One informant, explaining the experience of Jewish lawyers at white-shoe firms
concluded that the success was a symptom of a more general, even generic, phenomenon:

101

Informant #7, 9–10.
“Jews had a lot of trouble getting jobs in, I think, the Wall Street firms until the fift ies or sixties. I think
African American pride and Black independence in the United States and specifically in New Yo rk City
really helped the Jews” (Informant #15, 19). Notably, the belief that the decline of ethno-religious and
racial discrimination in the 1960s were reinfo rcing phenomena contrasted with the sentiment of some
within the Jewish and Catholic co mmunities fo llowing the Civil War who feared that greater racial equality
for African-A mericans might erode the standing and status of ethno -religious minorit ies. See Jonathan D.
Sarna, When General Grant Expelled the Jews (New Yo rk: Nextbook Schocken, 2012), 24–49.
103
Informant #10, 16.
104
Informant #12, 24.
102

“I think it's a general social change, I mean there were some people who were older
partners at that time in the 50's who just would not consider the idea of having a Jewish
partner, and life has changed a lot.”105 To the informant, the key issue was the overall
decline in anti-Semitism and religious-based discrimination. The success of Jewish
lawyers and Jewish firms was but the consequence of this general societal trend in the
legal profession. 106

B. The Powerful Interplay of Diminished Discrimination, the Rise of Inside Counsel,
High Visibility, and the Existence of a Jewish Client Base

The informants suggest that parallel developments within the legal profession
magnified the impact of decreased discrimination, making it even more likely that
corporate clients would retain Jewish law firms. The first trend was the rise of inside
counsel, and more specifically, the shift in decision-making authority within corporate
clients over the engagement of outside counsel from discriminating non- lawyer
executives to inside counsel. 107 For example, one informant recalled:

I was picked up by [a large corporation] and the General Counsel for [that large
corporation]. He saw me and formed an attachment to me. He saw all the lecturing
and the work I had been doing, and being retained by [that large corporation]
brought me into the world of [large entity in another industry] and [large
corporation in a third industry] because they were all working together on
legislative issues. [When] they brought me in as their counsel . . . I was really in the
world of the [general counsels] of . . . [these three corporations] . . . And the
relationships and the networking just began to expand and expand. And before I
105

Informant #19, 6.
Informant #19, 6– 7.
107
On the rise of inside counsel, see Jonathan R. Maslow, “The Rise of In -House Counsel,” California
Lawyer 1 (1981): 30; Robert L. Nelson and Laura Beth Nielson, “Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations,” Law & Society Review 34 (2000): 457– 94;
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knew it I was representing [multiple large corporate entities] . . . I just happened to
be a good lawyer, and I was doing good work. I got hired by [a fourth corporate
client] because they were in a case with [the large corporation who was already a
client] and they were going to get into trouble. They saw what I did and they came
in and hired me. It was that kind of networking and knowing. And, by the way,
around this time, the general counsel began to have a much greater role in hiring
outside lawyers. And somehow or another, that too helped break the barrier,
because the chairman of the board and the CEO didn't hire any more at country
clubs. He turned to his general counsel and said, “Get me the best lawyer you can,”
and if you [were an] outstanding lawyer in the 60's and the 70's and into the 80's,
you got hired. 108

Another informant explained that, while breaking down anti-Semitism was more
difficult in the corporate world, inside counsel helped sever the long-standing ties
between corporate clients and their WASP firms. 109
The second trend, which helped inside counsel to make the decision to hire Jewish
firms, was the high visibility of the practice of the Jewish firms and their prominent
attorneys. This trend also benefited from diminished discrimination. As one informant
put it:

Law, I think, was easier and medicine was easier, because once we became visible,
once we were capable of making ourselves visible, it became clear that we were
pretty good. And then one thing leads to another. I think law and medicine are kind
of unique because they are individual and you can make a reputation for yourself.
You can make a reputation climbing up the ladder in the world of the circumscribed
corporation but law, it seems to me, is a more open profession. You have more
capacity to be seen in law and medicine than you do in management. If you want a
career, you need to be seen so I think visibility is critical. 110

The informants suggest that Jewish law firms d isplayed their superstar power at a
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2067–2136.
110
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very opportune time; they began rising after 1945 and achieved prominence by the late
1970s and early 80s. This was the period before continued institutionalization of the large
firms rendered personal, individual visibility less apparent and anonymity became the
norm of large firm practice. “With increasing specialization and division of labor in the
blue-chip bar,” said a commentator, “the individual lawyer . . . has no opportunity to
stand out. The firms become the powers, not the men in them . . . In short, the blue-chip
bar has become a place for a man to make money, not to make his mark.” 111 This legal
environment was quite different from that of the early 1950s and 1960s, when attorneys
such as Milton Handler of Kaye, Scholer, Ira Millstein of Weil, Gotshal, Marty Lipton of
Wachtell, Lipton, and Joe Flom of Skadden, Arps rose to prominence and lent their
highly visible careers to their Jewish law firms. 112 In those early days of high visibility,
success in one major case could mean a ticket out of low status and an opportunity to
establish a large corporate client base. 113
Finally, the interplay of diminished discrimination, the rise of inside counsel, and the
high visibility of the work of prominent attorneys at Jewish firms was particularly
important to the growth of Jewish law firms and to their development of a large corporate
client base because initially Jewish law firms did not represent large entities, or even
large Jewish entities. For example, as one informant recollected: “XXX was a Jewish
firm. Its client base consisted of mostly Jewish clients, [but] it generally did not represent
industry leaders. Instead of representing the first or second largest garment maker, it
typically represented the third biggest. The firm's client base changed in the 1970s
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[when] New York City became about merit . . . The decline of the importance of old style
relationships was a big deal, replaced by merit representations.” 114 Indeed, one informant
at a large Jewish firm, describing the firm's clientele in the late 1960s, explained that
while “many of our clients were Jewish,” the firm had hardly any Fortune 500 clients.115
Another informant affirmed, “Interestingly enough, for the so-called gentile law firms, in
many cases, the principal business was with the Jewish banks. The [large] Jewish law
firms weren't representing [large] Jewish corporations.”116 One informant added:

Now, why did [Jewish clients] go to these big [WASP] law firms? Because people
wanted . . . their businesses. They thought they needed a fancy bank; they thought
they needed a fancy lawyer. They can be impressed with them [the WASP firms] . .
. I'm serious. I was angry about it. 117

These circumstances were echoed by another informant:

When [Jewish] clients started coming in from Brooklyn, somebody once
mentioned to me, “Why don't we open up an office in Brooklyn?” So, I told him,
“I feel that anybody that can afford our rates wants to come to a Manhattan
lawyer; they don't want to stay in Brooklyn.” That's true. 118

One informant recalled his frustration with observant Jewish clients taking their
business to non-Jewish or to secular Jewish firms:

I used to walk around almost resentful when I would see the Hasidic and obviously
Orthodox people sitting in offices of lawyers. Well, why weren't they coming to
me? I understand them, I know the culture. But no, that wasn't the issue. The issue
was they wanted successful lawyers and the lawyers had no problem dealing with
them. I think in the fifties I would have been embarrassed to bring one of them to
my office. 119
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To the extent that Jewish law firms did benefit from the existence of a Jewish client
base, the informants point out that rather than representing large Jewish clients, the
Jewish firms relied on a large number of smaller entity Jewish clients. One informant
described the client base of his law firm as mostly Jewish: “I think the large number were
Jewish, with some exceptions. A lot of the real-estate people were . . . Jewish clients. . . .
Today, you couldn't tell.”120 Another informant described the development of his
expertise as a function of the large number of small corporate clients represented by his
firm:

The [Jewish] firm I joined was basically a corporate law firm. That's what we did,
and when I joined it, unlike today, there weren't many defined departments. Maybe
there was a tax department, but beside that the young lawyers were assigned on an
occasional basis to whomever needed help and so my early practice experience was
exposure to a very diverse area. It involved lending and borrowing transactions,
investment transactions, a lot of small private corporations and organizational
development, bankruptcy, litigation, contracts. I mean you worked for a partner and
then you went to another partner. That is, there were no assignments so I was
luckier than people are today because I had very broad exposure to a wide variety of
things and circumstances. I developed [expertise] mostly in corporate, in corporate
finance and the securities area and I got involved in public offerings and everything
having to do with stocks and bonds. 121

The experience was shared by the following informant:

I came here [to a Jewish firm], I worked for I would say five years, doing
everything. I mean, we didn't have a very big bunch of clients but work was kind of
fun. 122

Moreover, the informants suggest that not only did large entity Jewish clients fail to
patronize the large Jewish firms, they also failed to use their influence to advocate for
increased diversity within their WASP law firms. Said one informant, “I have not
120
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perceived the entree of Jewish lawyers coming as a result of demands from Jewish
clients.”123 And another remarked:
I am not aware that . . . in the 70's clients were saying, “We want to make sure that
we have a Jewish lawyer [as] opposed to a non-Jewish lawyer,” or [asking that
firms be] more diverse . . . . From my perspective, I don't know if that is correct. . . .
[My] sense at the time was not that clients wanted more diversity. 124

Drawing a distinction between the conduct of large Jewish clients in the past and
contemporary corporate calls for increased diversity, one informant noted:

Very prominent investment firms had all of their personal business done by a
Jewish law firm. But their public business was done by a non-Jewish firm. They
made no effort whatsoever to encourage the non-Jewish firm to hire Jews.
However, once [Jewish attorneys] started to show up at [white-shoe firms], they did
feel a little more comfortable about that. But these [Jews at investment firms] were
the German Jewish people exercising their patrimonial rights [with regard to the
Jewish attorneys at white-shoe firms]. But I would not credit that point in history
any very serious attempt by them to influence the hiring or retention of people. I
wouldn't credit it all. Never saw it [referring to “A Call to Action,” a demand by
large corporations for greater diversity at large law firms 125 ]. . . . That is an example
of strong arming I have never seen before. But it is the kind of strong arming that is
going on now days. Nowadays it is acceptable. If it existed in earlier years, it was a
hell of a lot [more] subtle. 126

V. Increased Client Demand for Corporate Legal Services and the Growth of The Jewish
Firm
A. The Growth of Business Law and Increased Demand for Corporate Legal Services
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The growth of the large law firm is explained by a complex mix of demand and
supply considerations. 127 Increased demand for corporate legal services 128 explains in part
the rise and growth of large firms. Indeed, the Cravath blueprint for the organization of
the large law firm was, in part, an institutional response on the supply side to the
demands of large corporate clients. “It is well known that the large law firm was born . . .
in a period of institutional reorganization dominated by the rise of the giant business
corporation.”129 Thus, the rise of large law firms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was in response to the growing needs of big corporate clients. 130
After 1950, increased demand for legal services explains the growth of WASP and
Jewish law firms alike. The increase in corporate demand for legal services has been both
quantitative and qualitative. Significant growth in the body and scope of statutory and
administrative laws regulating the conduct of entity clients shaped the legal needs of
large corporate clients and called for a corresponding growth in the size and expertise of
the large law firms. 131 Nelson argues that increased government regulation of business,
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blockbuster litigation involving corporations, and the proliferation of high transaction
cost deals, 132 “reflects growing demand for corporate legal services of a type big firms
offer.”133 In addition, Nelson asserts that restructuring in the market for corporate legal
services further contributes to large firm growth: the shift from continuous, general
service relationships between corporate clients and law firms led to firm growth based on
highly specialized, often isolated, transactions and lawsuits. 134 Further, “the breakdown
of stable regional markets for law firms created a national market in corporate legal
services that was unprecedented. The leading firms in New York City and in other major
legal centers openly competed for the most lucrative client relationships and projects.” 135
Jewish law firms were able to take advantage of increased demand for corporate
legal services because the dominant WASP corporate bar was fairly small in terms of the
absolute number of large firms and their size, as well as in terms of the relative number
needed to deal with the increased client demand for corporate legal services. 136
Consequently, after 1945, Jewish firms gained ground on the WASP firms in a relatively
short time span. If the WASP firms had been either more numerous or bigger in size,
perhaps they would have been better positioned to meet the growing needs of corporate
clients and would have crowded out the Jewish firms. But their relative ly small number
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and size did not allow them to eliminate the competition. While the WASP firms grew
rapidly and consistently both before and after 1945, 137 their growth after 1945 could not
satisfy the even greater growing client demand for corporate legal services. 138
B. The “Economics of Discrimination”? Increased Demand and the Decline of ReligiousBased Discrimination

The increased demand for corporate legal services, which led to the growth of the
WASP firms in the first half of the twentieth century, contributed to the rise and growth
of the Jewish law firms after WWII. In addition, it led to a significant change in the
hiring and promotion practices of the large firms. The WASP law firms could not satisfy
their increased need for associates from within the ranks of WASP associates. They
began, gradually and hesitantly, to hire and eventually promote Jewish lawyers. One
informant affirmed this trend, stating:

As the . . . law business grew, the firms grew, [and] the need for high quality
lawyering grew, meaning a) the growth of business, b) the growth of business
regulation and the increasing need for lawyers, the need to give both legal and
ethical advice to keep these corporations out of trouble. . . . These law firms needed
people, and they couldn't afford to discriminate. Discrimination became a negative
business plan—they were shooting themselves in the foot because they had to reject
superior lawyers to hire ethnically acceptable inferior lawyers. . . . [It's] true
whether you're discriminating against Jews, . . . Catholics, . . . Asia ns, . . . Blacks,
or . . . anybody. Any time you discriminate, you take some guy who's not as good
over the person you're discriminating against, so as a business proposition. . . . I
think those are two factors that changed the world. 139

Another informant argued:

What changed? Brain-power needs. The complexity of the world became so great—
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an explosion in the marketplace, globalization, the growth of the economy. . . . The
coverage is so big that you need manpower. . . . So, you want to hire. You use them
all up, and you need talent, too. So, Harvard has 500 students and 250 are WASPs.
[All of the WASPs] get jobs, [and] there is [sic] still plenty of jobs for the other 250
Jews. So, the growth in the economy created a demand. They need more manpower.
They need more bodies and they need some talent . . . so . . . they need the Jews.
My view is as simple as that. It's the law of supply and demand. 140
And a third informant added:

I think that [the decline of discrimination against Jewish lawyers was] tie[d] into the
commercialization of the practice of law. And whether it's corporations or law
firms, we're looking simply for merit and for talent, so, [the] old school
[discriminatory hiring practices of] the firms in the teens, 20's and 30's wouldn't
work anymore. 141

The informants' accounts, however, caution against too-quickly accepting the theory
that competition leads to the decline of discrimination, as is evidenced in the following:

The firms ultimately had to take in Jewish people because they grew so quickly.
But my friend . . . in my class tells the story of going to a WASP firm [that was]
well known, and being shown around the conference room. They had medallions
from the various law schools, including Yale [whose seal includes several Hebrew
letters]. And one fellow there who did the interview . . . asked what ethnicity [my
friend] was. He said, “Czechoslovakian or what?” He said, “Can you read this?”
[referring to the Hebrew letters in Yale's seal]. So, there were relatively few Jews
who were being taken and that had to change because of the explosions in the law
firms and the demand for . . . smart lawyers. And if you were looking for smarts,
Jews had the big capital among them. 142
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Another informant pointed out that, while increased client demand was a key factor
causing both the growth of large firms and the decline of discrimination, the decline was
gradual and slow and took over twenty years to develop into the norm, and added, “I
believe in the 70's in some of the non-Jewish firms, they would have had more difficulty
accommodating for their needs.”143
A time-consuming, gradual change in the hiring and promotion practices of the
WASP firms meant that many Jewish lawyers in this “transition” period did not succeed
in securing a job and struggled to survive professionally. For many lawyers who had been
the objects of discrimination, the change came too late. The following account makes
explicit the consequence of a prolonged decline in discrimination:

My first job [was with] a firm called Gold & Bach & Burrell, a small firm [of]
about 10 or 11 lawyers. Jeff Gold graduated [from] Yale in 1941, first in his class,
then he started his own practice; Marty Burrell [graduated from] Harvard [with a
joint] M.B.A. & J.D in those days it took some doing . . . The firm eventually went
bankrupt, as did many of the firms, and I got fired my first year. I wanted to be a
corporate lawyer, and I thought it might be a bit different . . . Then I went to work
in a storefront in Brooklyn where I eked out a living doing wills and house closings,
making $5,000 a year, [and] moved to Court Street in Brooklyn. Then I got a break,
I went into the legislature. I rose to the position of chief counsel for the speaker of
the New York City senate. . . . I met a friend of mine who was a member of this
firm. And twenty- five years ago, I joined this firm and, little by little, I gradually
moved up to Senior Partner. 144

No doubt, diminished anti-Semitism and increased demand for corporate legal services
“generically” explain the rise and growth of the Jewish law firms. 145 Indeed, the latter
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provides a general explanation for the growth of all large law firms, including the old
WASP firms, rather than an account of the unique, faster growth of the Jewish firms. The
informants suggest, however, that the rise of the Jewish law firm was not generic. Rather,
it was also explained by the conduct and practices of the WASP firms.

VI. The Unique Growth of the Jewish Law Firm
A. White-Shoe Ethos and Protected Pockets of “Jewish” Practice Areas
The large WASP firms stayed clear of what they perceived to be “undignified”
practice areas, inconsistent with their white-shoe ethos and notions of professionalism,
such as real-estate, hostile takeover work, bankruptcy, and litigation. 146 As one informant
put it, “In the 1950s Jews were restricted to Jewish firms and Jewish practice areas.”147
Another remarked:

[A particular attorney] was a real-estate lawyer and litigator and a real-estate
investor—a very wealthy man. . . . And, as you probably know, at the time, the
largest firms at the time really had no real-estate partners. . . . That's not the case
today. . . . Real-estate, like divorce, was viewed as dirty work. And WASP lawyers
didn't get involved in real-estate . . . until they saw there was something worth
happening in the area. So, this fellow was involved in a variety of developments,
real-estate developments and otherwise. 148

This division is emphasized by another informant:

The specialization or over-specialization that we have now didn't exist then . . .
Real-estate was not a big thing in those days. . . . It was almost [unheard of] for the
large firms to have a real-estate department, and now that's a big thing . . . and
bankruptcy is big; when I say that I mean, what I'm trying to say, is that those
specialties in the old days were little firms that did only that—you had a bankruptcy
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firm, you had a real-estate firm. . . . There is much more specialization now. 149

This conduct by the WASP firms created pockets of practice that Jewish law firms
occupied and promptly came to dominate. In the hostile takeover market, for example,
Skadden, Arps and Wachtell, Lipton took advantage of the reluctance of the white-shoe
firms to get involved in a less than dignified practice and in the mid 1970s monopolized
this “Jewish pocket.” A commentator said of the monopoly:

Either because they're still snobby about such fighting, or because Flom and Lipton
have such a head start on them in experience and reputation, the old- line law firms
are still only rarely involved in tender fights. Usually, when a fight starts, a
company whom they represent as general counsel brushes them aside because the
investment bankers they're using have told them to get Flom or Lipton. 150

Consequently, Skadden, Arps and Wachtell, Lipton were able to monopolize the
hostile takeover pocket of practice:

There is probably no other major area of law where so small a group of attorneys,
and one attorney in particular, enjoys such total domination. . . . Flom today enjoys
unprecedented pre-eminence in the field. My count has him on one side or the
other, or working for the investment bankers, in ninety percent of the tender fights
of the last three years. Lipton is the only lawyer who seems to share even a portion
of the field with him. 151
Bankruptcy law was another example of an “undignified,” Jewish practice area. One
informant remembered:

Years ago it was like bankruptcy because they were collection lawyers. It was like a
primate part of the Bar, you weren't proud to be a collection lawyer and do
bankruptcy. Now [in the 21st century] the biggest firms have major bankruptcy
departments. 152

Another informant described how practicing in this protected pocket of practice
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allowed his firm to develop expertise and build its reputation:

We acted in the XXX Bankruptcy, which, up to that point was the largest
bankruptcy that had taken place in the US. And [a partner with the firm] headed the
effort on that. It turned out to be a very successful liquidation and established our
reputation as creditor's rights lawyers with the major banks. Also in [the same year],
we represented [a large corporation] which was on the brink of bankruptcy. We
acted as counsel to [that corporation] in working out a n agreement with banks and
[other parties] to solve its fiscal crisis. That too was a matter of considerable
notoriety particularly in the banking world and on Wall Street. So that [a few years
later], we had an established reputation for corporate me rger/acquisition/take over
matters, major creditor's rights problems, financial issues. 153

As one informant revealed, the Jewish pockets of practice allowed Jewish firms to
establish and develop a loyal client base, with little competition from the WASP firms:

We had a family; I've known that family for probably . . . forty-five years, through
thick and through thin, through marriages through divorces, etc. . . . They had to do
major estate planning, and I am totally capable of that. . . . I introduced them to the
person here that does that, and they put in a lot of time and effort . . . The person
that did the estate planning [later] left the firm and took with him the list of clients
he worked with . . . He wrote each of them a . . . nice form letter, saying, “If you
have any interest in your relationship, here's a release” . . . and this guy sent back a
little note that said, “[the informant] has been my lawyer for forty years [and] I'm
not changing now.”154

Building on client relationships within the Jewish pockets and establishing their
expertise and reputation, the Jewish firms were gradually able to cross over and represent
the same clients outside of the “undignified” arenas in “respectable” corporate affairs.
One informant described the transformation and expansion of the firm's client base:

In those days bankruptcy was not such a respectable practice but it smelled to me
like a big firm going into bankruptcy may just fit in one of these days and the rest is
history, because in the 70's, the real industry started to boom and here we were and
that practice just took off, the firm really took off, and of course it grew in other
areas too. 155
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Another informant similarly noted:

In 1969, we represented [a large corporation] in a merger with [another large
corporate entity]. That transaction ended up with two relationships that became very
important. We met [a banker at a large investment bank] in that transaction and he
liked the work that we did and as a result of that we began to do a fair a mount of
work for [the investment bank], which was one of the leading investment banks.
And the company that acquired [our 1969 corporate client] liked what we did and
we began to do a significant amount of legal work for [the acquiring entity] which
was a major step forward in that we were now representing a leading Wall Street
investment bank and one of the country's largest corporations. Both were very
active clients. 156

Several years later, a successful representation of one corporate client in conjunction
with a takeover attempt saw the client base of the firm grow from one major client, to
several clients the following year, to several hundred clients a decade later. 157
Importantly, the firm was able to expand its practice and client base beyond the protected
practice areas into mainstream corporate practice, so much so that the informant revealed
that “[Today] we're fairly active in what I call the corporate governance area, advising
companies as to how to structure their board processes and corporate governance
guidelines and so on which has become a major part of our practice.”158
While the WASP firms were willing to concede “dirty” law practice to the Jewish
firms, they were unable to contain the areas of concession. The Jewish firms crossed over
to the “dignified” practice areas, as is noted in the following:

When the tender-offer boom began a few years ago, Flom became a hot
commodity, not only to raiders but to the more established target companies who
decided they'd rather have him defending them than attacking them. As late as
1970, Skadden, Arps had 29 lawyers. . . . Now the firm has ninety. . . . This
skyrocketing growth dwarfs the much slower expansion of the old, white-shoe firms
on Wall Street. . . . Joe's done the most magnificent thing anyone's ever done i[n]
the law business. . . . He's broken the link between the old investment-banking firms
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and blue-chip companies and their Wall Street lawyers. 159

Moreover, white-shoe ethos not only restricted the growth of WASP firms in terms
of practice areas, but also limited their growth in terms of lateral hiring, which was
considered rude and unprofessional. 160 As one informant recalled:

After I'd been [in public service] for five years, I decided I wanted to go back to
private practice and I wanted to return to New York I remember looking through
the New York Martindale-Hubbell trying to see if there was any firm there that
appealed to me and I came to the conclusion that there wasn't. You know there were
certain firms that are famous never taking in people that are laterals. In more recent
years there have been a few exceptions to that, but basically you know the major
firms at that level didn't take in laterals. So it wasn't so hard to exclude those firms.
The only firm I went to made me an offer, promised a partnership. [It was] still very
definitely a Jewish firm with these two Catholic partners. 161

The Jewish firms, on the other hand, uninhibited by the weight of white-shoe culture,
were aggressive in recruiting laterally. One informant described such hiring patterns at
his firm:

We do a lot of lateral hiring. And, if you look at the economics of it, assuming that
you take in thirty or forty kids, how many of them are going to become partners? . .
. I mean, economics doesn't permit it, which means you have to get rid of people
along the way. And . . . you have to fill in the gaps at some point. And so you bring
people in, while you're getting rid of people. It's a strange dynamic, but it exists. So,
we do a great deal of that and more. 162

Another informant recalled his personal experience when he was laterally cherry-picked
to lead the corporate department of a large Jewish firm:

About twenty- five years ago, in 1981, after eighteen years [elsewhere, with another
Jewish firm, which was also growing] I joined [a different large Jewish firm] as
head of the corporate department. . . . We hired nine people . . . and they were really
first rate people. . . . We had people from many different firms. . . . and one of the
159
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partners came with me and is with me still, and an associate came with me and
eventually became a partner and subsequently led the real-estate department. Also
[having] join[ed] was the head of our corporate department. 163

The contrast between the aggressive recruiting practices of the Jewish firms and the
more passive practices of the WASP firms, as well as their consequences in terms of
lateral recruitment and retaining talent, are captured in the following account of one
informant:

I think one or two people left, and [a small Jewish firm I was with before being
recalled into the army] called and asked me to come down and talk to them, which I
did, and they said, “We would like you to come back. We're sorry you left us; it's a
year or two later, but we'd like you to come back.” And they made me a very
substantial salary offer, which was substantially more than I was making [at the
new firm], and I was making twenty-five percent more than I had been making
there when I left. . . . Now, we're talking early 1960s, so $12,000 a year was a lot of
money, and I think I was making $12,000 here and they offered me $16,000 or
$18,000, which was a stupendous amount of money, and I told them I really was
very comfortable here, that I really like[d] the people here [and] I liked what I was
doing. I had a career here, and I was staying. 164

B. Effective Discrimination by the WASP Firms and its Consequences: The Creation of a
Robust Entry-Level and Lateral Pool of Elite Jewish Lawyers to the Benefit of the Jewish
Law Firms

In the 1950s and 1960s, WASP law firms effectively discriminated against Jewish
lawyers. 165 According to one informant, “There's no question that in 1955 the major New
York law firms were not hiring Jews.”166 Echoing the same sentiment, another informant
remembered, “I was at the top of the class and very high ranked student. I started
interviewing in the downtown law firms, not a chance. There was no way that a Jewish, a
young Jewish lawyer was going to get accepted into the big firms. It just wasn't going to
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happen.”167 A third informant noted, “When I came down to look for a job in 1953 there
weren't too many Jews being hired so, it was just beginning. There were then some firms
that had no Jews, some major law firms that had some Jews and unless it was a Jewish
firm even the ones that had some Jews didn't have many.” 168
The realities of discriminatory practice were clearly perceived by Jewish attorneys.
“I suppose it was just generally assumed that Jewish people, or Jewish boys—it was all
boys then—wouldn't go to a Sullivan & Cromwell or something else like that,” recalled
one informant. “There certainly was discrimination . . . so that is all true.” 169 One of the
informants added:

In the fall of 1953, a number of members of my class were elected to the board of
editors. And that also coincided with our looking for jobs for the summer of 1954.
If you looked at the board of the Columbia Law Review from the class of ‘54, ‘55
there was a very, very significant Jewish population on that board so going back to
the attitudes of myself and my colleagues in the fall of ‘53, then there were Jewish
firms [like] Proskauer, Strauss and Spiegelberg, although frankly, I was unaware of
that firm at that time, and I don't know anyone in my class who went to that firm.
And there was one firm which was regarded as egalitarian and that was Paul Weiss
which had Jewish partners, Catholic partners, and Ge ntile partners and even the
occasional black associate. Many people in my class had a lot of trouble getting
summer jobs. I don't know what the percentages were but [I have a] clear memory
of how discouraged many people were going through the interview process over
and over again and not getting any offers. So you know at the end of the summer of
1954, we entered our third year in law school. And except for people who had
offers from the summer everybody went through the same process all over again,
and also I have the same memory of how discouraged people were. 170
The same frustration was expressed by another informant:
This would have been early ‘58, the downtown white-shoe firms were simply not
really hiring Jews as they do now. . . . Certainly, the discrimination was evident to
me when I was at . . . law school, and none of us had any doubt that it was there. I
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mean, we all talked about it, and we recognized it and deplored it. 171

By effective discrimination, I do not mean to suggest that no Jewish lawyers were
hired by the WASP firms. For example, one informant noted:

I had, as I started to look in the job market in 1955, had mentally thought that there
were two problems I faced. One, [my law school] was not ranked with Harvard or
Columbia, and secondly because I am Jewish, and not the least hesitant to say so I
thought that I was relegated to firms that were not of size or substance, and in point
of fact I literally stumbled into the offices of [a large white-shoe firm]. Literally
stumbled in without an appointment, without prearranged anything and asked for an
interview. At the end of the very first interview, I had a job offer, but was told that I
had to come back for a second round. So I came back for the second round, had the
offer and was accepted on the spot . . . But it was my impression that life being
what it was, my destiny was to be in one of the smaller firms. To my surprise, [a
large white-shoe firm], which had no Jewish partners [extended me an o ffer]. 172

Another informant described his experience interviewing at a large white-shoe firm:

Then in my second year I decided I should try New York . . . [a mixed firm] was
clearly the place I sort of wanted to go . . . I went to [a white-shoe firm] [because] I
figured I really would not care for it, and so it would be a good sort of stress
interview for me, good thing to subject myself to. And I actually interviewed there
first. . . . So, I go [to the white-shoe firm] first and am interviewed by a man. He
was so different than my expectations, that I was just you know . . . I left the office
and my expectations were . . . I went to [the mixed firm] . . . Somebody there at
some point suggested that it was a strike against me that I wasn't on the law review.
They sort of didn't care for that. By the way, I have many friends there. I respect the
firm immensely . . . So, I just sat there not knowing what the hell to do, and I
decided finally to go with my heart, and I went with [the white-shoe firm]. I
enjoyed the summer and came back and stayed. That's the law firm choice. 173

Rather, my aim is to convey a professional reality whereby discrimination was the
norm at WASP law firms. This discrimination was indicated by the following informants'
accounts:

[I] found a job here. And this was a very small firm at the time. It was a
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predominantly Jewish firm because, even in those days, it wasn't easy for Jews to
break into the large law firms. Although, some of the major firms did have Jewish
partners. White & Case had one and Sullivan & Cromwell had a couple. But, it was
not the norm. 174
Absolutely—there's no question about that now—I cannot give you statistics, [and]
I'm sure some of these “pubas” would argue with me, but I was there. I saw it
happen. The major firms who were known as the white-shoe firms—the Gentile
firms—they hired Jews, but very few. In no way did they hire Jews in proportion to
the number of Jews that were at the top of their class and were successful in law
school—that simply didn't happen. 175

In addition, WASP firms that did hire Jewish attorneys as associates tended not to
promote them to partnership. 176 Tellingly, one informant recalled:

I went back to [a large white-shoe firm after a couple of years in public service],
and was told that I would have to take my place in line as one option. The other
option was to try to get a partnership in [another] firm. I had those offers at the
time. [A large Jewish firm] was one of the firms that offered me a partnership.
Looking at the opportunities, and even at that point of time—now this in 1968—I
had a considerable concern about what the opportunities were for Jews in the field,
and opted for [the large Jewish firm] to get that issue out of the way. 177
Another informant similarly noted, “At the time, we [at a large white-shoe firm] had a lot
of associates who were Jewish, probably not in the same proportion as now, but . . .
many. [There were] many senior associates, but none of them stayed, and none of them
made partner.”178
Importantly, whereas in the decades preceding World War II, elite colleges and law
schools discriminated against Jewish students by imposing admission quotas, 179
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beginning in the late 1940s and throughout the 1960s, a growing number of Jewish
attorneys were top graduates and editors of the Law Review at elite law schools. 180 As
one informant remembered:

What was happening in the early 50's was the opportunity to get into a really top
flight law school as graduates of the Hebrew College . . . There had been a few
exceptions [Jewish graduates of Hebrew College who were admitted to elite law
schools before the 1950s] . . . Suddenly, in our time in 1954 and 1955, the [elite]
law school opened up at Harvard for whatever reason. Generally Hebrew College
graduates had done very well in graduate school and they gave the school a very
much-deserved reputation. And so it was like, “Hey, you know you could really go
to a good law school.” And I think that was the attraction for me . . . and now it
seemed like even guys like me could get in. 181

Still, many Jewish graduates of elite law schools could not find a job with the whiteshoe firms. The informants affirmed this fact in the following accounts:

Because, no, you got into law school and the minorities did well, the Jewish
students did well . . . [but] they still couldn't get jobs. It wasn't the law school, so it
had to be some other thing . . . The Jewish kids at the top of the class had a tougher
time . . . with the white-shoe law firms. 182
Getting a job was impossible. It was impossible because the law firms that hired
law students were all—with the exception of a couple, which I will tell you about—
blatantly anti-Semitic. . . . They posted—and I remember to this day—on the
bulletin board of the Yale Law School—this great liberal bastion of universal love
of all creeds—the interviews that were to be given at the Yale Law School campus.
Fifty percent of the law school was Jewish, [and] not one single Jewish name—not
one single—[was posted], including the editor- in-chief of the Yale Law Journal . . .
or . . . the man who was first in his class . . . I complained, so they took this list and
they went to the Hotel Taft in New Haven, and they interviewed them down there.
A Sabbath[-]observing Jew is like having cancer on top of AIDS—useless. The law
firms that hire[d] were few in number. 183
you'll be a very lucky boy”’ (Informant # 21, 3). See, generally, Jero me Karabel, The Chosen: The Hidden
History of Ad mission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale and Princeton (New Yo rk: Houghton Mifflin
Co mpany, 2005).
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Graduating Law School in 1958 was tough times for jobs generally . . . I don't think
I encountered the normal discrimination so to speak because I don't think I had even
attempted to get into the white-shoe firms . . . So there were plenty of firms to go to
that you didn't have to try to break into where you were not wanted. 184

As a result of these discriminatory hiring and promoting practices, Jewish attorneys
tended to flock to the Jewish law firms, sometimes self- selecting out of even applying for
a position with the WASP firms. “I wouldn't interview [with] those [WASP] firms,” said
one informant. 185 And another noted, “I think many of them practiced discrimination not
even realizing it was discrimination; plus the fact that there's also self-discrimination
where people don't apply there because they . . . don't want to be rejected.” 186
The deeper roots of self-selection were described as follows by an informant who
interviewed with WASP firms, but ended up accepting an offer from a Jewish firm:

And then there is reverse discrimination . . . I did not do much interviewing [with
WASP firms,] but I do remember . . . several years later I met somebody at [a
WASP firm] and he said to me, “[W]hy didn't you respond to our offer?” I said
“what [offer]?” He said, “We telephoned your home, and I think we spoke to your
mother, and we made you an offer. We asked you to call; you never called back.”
So I said, “I didn't call back because I didn't know that it happened.” So, at an
appropriate time, I said to my mother, “Mother, do you remember getting a call
from [the WASP firm] offering me a job?” She said, “yes.” “How come you didn't
related job while attending college:
Nobody had better credentials than me. I was chief editor of the high school newspaper. Nobody
had better criteria, it was irrelevant. It was totally irrelevant. So the lady described the position,
and said, “Well, we would expect you to come in at X and you leave at Y, and once every three
weeks, you'd be expected to come in to work on Saturday. We rotate that.” And I told her, “Well, I
can come in and work on Sunday or at night but I am an observant Jew and I cannot work on
Saturday.” Now you'd think that, today it is not an issue, wrong at that time. “Oh well, we have
two or three Hebrews” –that was her expression, Hebrews—“but they all come in and work on
Saturday.” I said that I'm afraid that I would not be able to. That was it. So it was very satisfying
for me to be in an office thirty-five years later with a Jewish client who prevailed, they were a
target and won [against a client represented by the law firm with which the informant sought the
position as a college student]. And I learned later that one of the founders of the firm was Jewish.
But I never knew that until much later that that was the case (Infor mant #2, 6).
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tell me about it?” [I asked]. She said, “Well, you already had a job offer from a firm
that was very.” She wouldn't have used this word—“egalitarian”—I don't know
what word she used. She said, “And I thought it was a good firm, and I didn't see
any reason why you should consider an offer from a Gentile firm.” So, the point I'm
trying to make . . . is that it worked both ways. 187

Another informant commented about the disapproval of his classmates upon
learning of his decision to join a white-shoe firm:

I remember when I went to [a white-shoe firm] for the summer and came back from
the summer, then when I announced I was going to go back there after graduation, a
number of my classmates, particularly Jewish classmates, made it clear that they
disapproved of my decision. I don't want to say made it clear, there are various
ways of making things clear and it just infuriated me that they were drawing upon
these stereotypes that get to them and they obviously did, because they are so fixed.
[Stereotypes] count, they matter . . . There's no question that a stereotype was
present. Then it subsisted for a while. I do think it isn't there today, but I could be
wrong. It just really got me pretty upset, mostly disappointed in the people who
otherwise, had good judgment. 188

The effective discrimination by the WASP firms resulted in the creation of a large
pool of highly qualified attorneys from which the Jewish firms could pick and choose
elite talent at their discretion. A partner at a Jewish firm recalled, “We hired nine people,
of which six had continued into federal clerkships. And they were really scholastically
outstanding: we had several editors and editors- in-chief who were authors of the Harvard
Law Review . . . They were really first rate people.”189 One informant concluded, “the
Jewish firms' edge was that they were getting the Jewish students at a period when the
non-Jewish firms were actually not hiring,”190 and another opined that [Jewish firms]
“benefited from discrimination, [we] recruited a lot of Jewish attorneys.”191 A third
informant noted:
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In terms of recruitment I perceived there was, still at that point of time, this is now
1967, 1968, 1969, to 1970, a divide. That younger people who aspired to achieve,
who were of the Jewish faith, had less opportunity, except in targeted areas, or
targeted firms like [a large Jewish firm], to grow, whereas, non-Jews had no
problems. So the opportunity was to get really talented people from that market,
and later on from that market of women lawyers trying to achieve who likewise had
the same barrier and so we pushed actively in those two areas because the chances
of getting a well qualified Law Review graduates in one or another of those markets
was greater than getting somebody who was not Jewish because he or she might go
to [a particular white-shoe firm] or [another particular white-shoe firm]. 192

Indeed, one informant suggested that some at Jewish law firms saw it as their mission to
hire discriminated-against, elite Jewish lawyers: “One outstanding example was [a
particular Jewish law firm] [which] . . . made its business to hire Jews—particularly
Orthodox Jews—that came from law schools and couldn't get jobs otherwise.” 193
The existence of a large, talented pool of Jewish candidates, over- looked by the
WASP firms and consequently available to work for the Jewish firms, was also
confirmed by an informant recalling his job- hunting days:

I already had the understanding that the firms I would be looking at would be the
Jewish firms, and it was not because I was looking for the Jewish firms, but I was
looking for a job, and whether right or wrong, I do not know—all I can give you is
personal experience—there was a feeling that the white-shoe firms downtown . . .
were not interested in Jews. I can't say that [from] firsthand testimony, [but] I do
know [that] when I came to [a growing Jewish firm] they hired me . . . relatively
quickly, [and] I concluded [that] this would be anecdotal . . . [to] whatever
discrimination or alleged discrimination or the perception of discrimination that was
occurring in these large firms. . . . We were getting, in my opinion, the cream of the
crop, and when I say “cream of the crop,” let's face it, there were non-Jews that
were cream of the crop too, but many Jews would feel the same [way] that I did and
therefore immediately opt for a firm like [ours]. When I came to the firm . . . there
were fifty- four lawyers, and now there's . . . four or five hundred . . . with offices all
over. 194

In conclusion, the Jewish firms benefited from near exclusive access to this talented
pool of attorneys between the early 1950s and the mid 1960s, and to a lesser, yet still
192

Informant #22, 7– 8.
Informant #8, 5–6.
194
Informant #10, 2– 3.
193

significant, degree between the mid 1960s and the early 1980s—access that allowed them
to grow at a pace faster than that of the WASP firms while recruiting and retaining top
talent.
Curiously, and seemingly contrary to the basic logic of supply and demand, the pool
of elite Jewish candidates throughout the 1950s and 1960s remained large,
notwithstanding discrimination by the WASP firms and limited hiring by the growing,
but still relatively small, Jewish firms. In other words, in spite of relatively weak demand
for their services by discriminatory WASP firms and growing Jewish firms, the supply of
talented Jewish lawyers graduating from elite law schools remained robust. The
informants suggest a complex interplay of religious, cultural, and socio-economic
considerations that drove many Jews to attend elite law schools in spite of grim hiring
prospects. Some suggest the affinity between Judaism and Jewish studies and law. 195 One
informant affirmed this affinity, stating:

When I started . . . I was in tax law. There are, I think, a greater proportion of
people with a religious studies background in tax law than in anything else, because
I think there is a parallelism. . . . Tax has an affinity [with the Talmud in that] you
are [dealing with] a multitude of layered interpretations. 196

Others highlighted the commitment within the Jewish community to education:

I became a lawyer just because I wanted more education. I didn't have any lawyers
in my family. I didn't know any lawyers but I went to law school because I wanted
more education and I didn't have a particular career path. 197

Indeed, the connection between religious upbringing and education, on the one hand,
and law, on the other, entailed a commitment not only to pursuing graduate education but
to elite education, status, and credentials as building blocks for a future professional
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Informant #15, 1– 3. The informant said later, “And I will say that, oddly enough, Talmudic study is a
very similar experience to law” (6). See, generally, Auerbach, Rabbis and Lawyers, 42.
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Informant #4, 19– 20.
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career. An informant confirmed:

From Ramaz [an orthodox Jewish school] I was admitted both to Columbia and to
Harvard, and much to the disappointment of the people at Ramaz, I chose to go to
Columbia. They would've liked me to go to Harvard, which says something about
that. . . . I think I wanted to be a lawyer from the time I was ten years old. . . . There
was no one in the family that I knew who was a lawyer . . . I think I liked dealing
with words and writing . . . So . . . law seemed like an obvious extension of the
kind of things that I was good at . . . . I could read fast, I could articulate well, and
so forth. . . . The only diversion was the possibility of going to Yeshiva to
Rabbinical School. . . . Then I considered seriously for career reasons maybe I'd
rather be a rabbi than a lawyer. [I] decided that while I might like studying to be a
rabbi, I would never like the work, [whereas] even if I didn't like studying [the] law,
I was sure I was going to like [practicing law], from what I could see. 198

Other informants describe a cultural background in which graduate school was an
obvious extension of their upbringing, if not the only acceptable choice after college. 199
Particularly telling is the following account of an informant who describes his decision to
attend law school as his only available option to avoid starvation:

I went to law school because, like many children of rabbis, it's a form of rebellion to
not go into your father's profession. I found [being a rabbi] to be a very difficult
profession—great physical and psychological toll. . . . So, being a rabbi was not for
me. I had no scientific skills. Also, many of my classmates were [studying to be
doctors]; in those days, it was the biggest accomplishment to be a Jewish doctor. . .
. So, I didn't want to compete in the world of doctors. It was hard enough to get into
medical school for Jews at the time. There were so many who wanted to be doctors.
So, I took up a little art education, having zero money, no capita l, [and] no abilities
198

Informant #4, 1, 3.
One informant described the cultural and educational background that led him to attend law school as
follows:
Everybody, all our nephews and relatives were all doctors. My brother's a doctor, my cousins are
doctors. I was the first lawyer in the fa mily, I majored in sociology and my brother came in fro m
med ical school and said, “What do you do with sociology . . . you have to take chemistry.” So I
put myself through a year of chemistry to satisfy him. And I took calcu lus and math and said, “I
don't want to be a doctor” (Informant #20, 12).
Another informant's account revealed similar influences. “It was, very frankly, it was the choice of being a
doctor or being a lawyer. I couldn't stand the sight of blood. I had a large mouth at that time already and
thought that the law would be an appropriate alternative” (Informant # 22, 3). The same info rmant also
discussed the relationship between the Jewish commun ity and a strong educational drive: “Fro m the get -go,
education has been a cornerstone of those of the Jewish faith in terms of their religion and in terms of their
home life and their experiences and the like. And the same is with Catholics by the way. There is a
secondary reason in some areas and that is . . . a sense of patrimony about looking after one's own . . .
There is some unity between Jews among compatriots as there is in Catholics. In terms of scholarship there
are some Jews that do exceedingly well and there are some that do terribly. But the cornerstone of
educational need and the requirement is beaten into you the first day” (9– 10).
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to open a business because there were very few Jews in bus iness, unless they were
running their parents['] business. . . . I learned not to starve to death. The only thing
that was available to me was to get a law degree. 200

While the informant's perception regarding law practice as a possible lucrative
occupation was, as we have seen, somewhat mistaken, his reasoning is nonetheless
revealing. He subjectively perceived his only career options as a rabbi, a doctor, a
scientist, or an attorney.
Other informants identified a poor socio-economic background as the driving force
behind attending law school; law school and a career as a lawyer represented not only a
natural extension of an educational path, but also a ticket out of poverty. 201 One
informant said:

Thompson Harris was a preparatory high school for city college and city college
professors taught in the high school. If you wanted to be eligible to go to this high
school, you had to pass an examination, and if you passed the exam, you obviously
went. If you didn't pass, you went to the regular high schools. I was fortunate
enough to go to Thompson Harris, which was a great educational experience. . . .
[After WWII,] I finished at law school and then I got a fellowship at the Lo ndon
School of Economics, by which time . . . my wife was at the University of
London. 202

Similarly, another informant recalled:

[I] lived in Brooklyn for virtually all of my childhood in a two-family home. [I
w]ent to [the] Horace Mann School [an elite prep school] [and] rode the subway for
an hour and twenty minutes each day. . . . I remember in high school wanting to be
a lawyer. I actually am one of those people that said that's what I'm going to be, and
that was somewhere around the age of sixteen, so I never had any doubt. 203
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Informant #22 , 1–3.
A legal career was not uniformly perceived as a means of upward mobility. One informant noted, “We
were not ‘upward ly mobile’ in the co mmon sense. The American dream was not for [my fat her, a rabbi].
He did not get a benefit fro m it, and he had no interest in me having the benefit of it . . . I don't think [my
father] was particularly interested in my beco ming a lawyer, but he would have liked me to continue to
study Jewish law” (Info rmant #3, 10).
202
Informant #1, 3.
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Informant #5, 1–2. Another informant recalled :
Then when I finished the sixth grade my parents, and I think it was particularly my mother,
thought the Fort Lee public school system is not what she wanted for her child. So s he and two
other families banded together and they formed a carpool and enrolled us into a school called
201

One informant revealed, “[My parents] were not highly educated people. I have two older
brothers. I was very fortunate to be able to have a good education. The schools were quite
helpful with the financial drain at that time.” 204
The robust supply of elite Jewish lawyers was thus not as sensitive to weak demand
and challenging job prospects because, for many Jewish men, the decision to attend an
elite law school was more than a mere cost-benefit analysis. Rather, it was the product of
their upbringing, which emphasized education and scholarly pursuits as important and
desirable values, commitment to graduate education, a perception that the law was a
worthy alternative to a religious career, and a sense of debt to parental sacrifices that
demanded a scholarly and thoughtful career path. 205 The unique combination of effective
discrimination against Jewish law students and attorneys by white-shoe firms and the
commitment of Jewish students to enroll in elite law schools notwithstanding grim job
prospects upon graduation thus resulted in the creation of a large ta lented pool of Jewish
lawyers from which the growing Jewish firms recruited nearly exclusively.
C. The Transformation of Professional Ideology and the Flip Side of Bias 206

The decline of the old, prevailing large law firm professionalism paradigm and the rise of

Horace Mann in New York City. There were t wo brothers in one family, one in another and I and
we were the only children fro m New Je rsey going to Horace Mann. So I went to school in New
Yo rk. Most of my friends were fro m New York, but I still lived in New Jersey. The social scene
was a little bit strange for me (Informant #12, 2).
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Informant #6, 1.
An upbringing committed to education and excellence as a means of pursuing the American Dream and
socioeconomic mob ility is, of course, not unique to Jews and is common among other minority groups.
See, e.g., A my Chua, Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother (New York: Penguin Press, 2011); Peter H. Huang,
“Tiger Cub Strikes Back: Memories of an Ex-Child Prod igy about Legal Education and Parenting,” British
Journal of American Legal Studies 1 (2012): 297–347, on upbringing and commit ment to education among
some Asian-American parents.
206
By the “flip side of bias,” I mean to denote the positive consequences of prejudice and contrast them
with the usual negative outcomes of bias. See “An Interview with Jennifer Lee: What is Stereotype
Pro mise?” http://www.russellsage.org/blog/interview-jennifer-lee-what-stereotype-promise (last visited
July 10, 2013).
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the business paradigm, what Russell Pearce has called a “paradigm shift,”207 played an
important, and unexpected, role in the growth of the Jewish firms. As a result of a gradual
ideological paradigm shift at large law firms—the decline of white-shoe ethos,
paternalistic collegiality and secrecy, 208 and the rise of a more explicitly competitive
business ideology emphasizing the financial bottom line, profits-per-partners, an eatwhat-you-kill ethos, and around the clock client service—the same prejudices,
stereotypes, and bias that fueled and helped sustain effective discrimination against
Jewish attorneys under the old ideology made Jewish attorneys and Jewish law firms
desirable under the new model. That is, the paradigm shift in the underlying ideology of
large law firms that replaced the prevailing white-shoe ethos with a more explicitly
business-oriented notion of professionalism resulted in the “flip side o f bias”; namely, it
rendered the loathed “qualities” of Jewish lawyers under the old model—wealth
maximizing, manipulative on behalf of clients, and instrumentalism, not to say
conniving—into positive attributes of lawyering under the new one. The very same
stereotypes that fueled prejudice against Jewish lawyers and Jewish law firms were now
perceived as desirable qualities. 209
The informants’ accounts confirm that the “flip side of bias” was a general
phenomenon operating outside of the legal profession. For example, one informant
stated, “The medical corps did not qualify for combat service because the general I.Q.
207

See Russell G. Pearce, “The Professionalism Parad ig m Shift : Why Discarding Professional Ideology
Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar,” N.Y.U. Law Review 70 (1996): 1229–76; Eli Wald,
“Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of Women
Lawyers at Large Law Firms,” Fordham Law Review 78 (2010): 2245, 2264–73. See also Richard A.
Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999),
185–211.
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One informant's account of being promoted to partner demonstrates the old paradigm and its approach to
disseminating information:
[A] hint was when I was invited to a lunch with the head of the firm, who invited all of the
partners to his home on Long Island for lunch in the fall. And if you were invited there, and you
were an associate, it was a pretty good sign . . . But I did not know when the partners made these
decisions . . . I was called out of a deposition in Ph iladelph ia and the head of the firm . . . told me I
just went to partner. I had a hard t ime understanding what he was saying. He just sort of dumped it
out. I went back into deposition and couldn't tell anybody (Informant #12, 10– 11).
209
See Wald, “The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms,” Part II.C.3.

was far below army standards. So, they took five Jewish kids from New York and put
them in the medical corps so they could raise the general average so it became combatworthy.”210
Yet, they emphasize the interplay of the “flip side of bias” phenomenon with factors
such as the possession of cultural and social capital, especially the notion of high
intellectual self-esteem, in explaining their success. 211 The same informant added:

Probably, in the back of my mind, there was the expectation that I would attend law
school at some point. But, since I couldn't afford it, it was a vague hope. But then I
got the scholarship at Yale, and that permitted me to participate in Yale activities,
and after that, I went into the army, and then the G.I. Bill came along and that
provided me with adequate funds. 212

Describing his experience at Harvard Law School one informant recalled a process
of great intellectual growth, “I went to law school very unsophisticated and very ignorant.
I did not know anything about law, about Harvard, or about much else related to the legal
profession. But I was a pretty good soldier, and I went and did what I was supposed to
do.”213 Within a year, however, “All sorts of things happened to me in my second year at
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See Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Cap ital,” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of
Education, ed. John G. Richardson (New Yo rk: Green wood, 1986), 241–58; James S. Co leman, “Social
Capital in the Creation of Hu man Cap ital,” American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988): 95, 100–101. On the
impact of cultural and social capital on lawyers’ careers, see, e.g., Fiona M. Kay and John Hagan,
“Cult ivating Clients in the Co mpetition for Partnership: Gender and the Organizat ional Restructuring of
Law Firms in the 1990s,” Law & Society Review 33 (1999): 517, 542; Fiona M. Kay and John Hagan,
“Raising the Bar: The Gender Strat ification of Law-Firm Cap ital,” American Sociology Review 63 (1998):
728, 737; Ronit Dinovitzer, “Social Capital and Constraints on Legal Careers ,” Law & Society Review 40
(2006): 445, 445– 47, 451–52; Bryant G. Garth and Joyce Sterling, “Exp loring Inequality in the Corporate
Law Firm Apprenticeship: Do ing the Time, Finding the Love,” Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22
(2009): 1361, 1368; John P. Heinz et al., Urban Lawyers: The New Social Structure of the Bar (Ch icago:
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 69; John Hagan, “The Gender Stratification of Inco me Inequality
Among Lawyers,” Social Forces 68 (1990): 835, 837; Jo Dixon and Carroll Seron, “Stratificat ion in the
Legal Profession: Sex, Sector and Salary,” Law & Society Review 29 (1995): 381, 382; David B. Wilkins,
“Doing Well by Do ing Good? The Role of Public Serv ice in the Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers ,”
Houston Law Review (2004): 1, 27 (arguing that for black lawyers, a lack of social capital in the form of
elite networks maintains or reinforces their disadvantage in the profession); John Hagan et al., “Cultural
Capital, Gender and the Structural Transformat ion of Legal Pract ice,” Law & Society Review 25 (1991):
239, 239–44.
212
Informant #1, 2.
213
Informant #3, 19.
211

law school. I became much more sophisticated and ‘worldly.”’ 214 Tellingly, the informant
never doubted his own capacity to grow so rapidly, to succeed, even excel at law school.
Confident in his intellectual abilities, it was only a matter of time until he was to prove
his talents. “I had been a young ‘hot shot’ student when I got out of law school.” 215
Another informant explained his decision to attend law school as follows: “[I]
probably [chose law school] because . . . I like to read; I like intellectual exercises, and
actually the affinity between law and mathematics, although using very different types of
ways of the intellectual exercise, the logical exercise[s] are very similar.”216 One
informant explained that after graduating from law school he felt socially awkward. It
was not merely that he self-selected out of interviewing with the large white-shoe firms
because he thought they would not hire a Jew, or with the large Jewish firms because he
thought they would not hire an Orthodox Jew. Rather, it was his perception that his lack
of people skills would lead to failure in interviewing. 217 But, the informant reasoned, this
notion of social awkwardness explains why he, and possibly other Jews, was interested in
law. Many Jews thought that the only obstacle they had to overcome was social
awkwardness. They never doubted their own abilities otherwise. Law was an “obvious”
choice because “once you overcome the social factor, your mental capacities are there
and Jews are confident in their ability to exercise judgment.” 218 Law schools, the
informant concluded, “made it possible for Jews to play the game.”219
Indeed, high intellectual self-esteem played a role not only in the success of Jewish
law students at elite law schools and of Jewish attorneys at large firms, but it also helps
explain the growth and success of Jewish law firms. One informant explained that since
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there was no legal authority for a positio n he wanted to take, “I wrote [an] article which
provoked the debate. In a way sometimes it's very useful to have the entire academic
world take the opposite position because there must be something to your position if
everybody in the academic world argues against it.”220 The point is not merely that the
informant's position subsequently became the law on the issue ; rather, it is that the
informant, a practicing attorney, felt completely comfortable doing battle with leading
scholars in the academic arena.
The informants highlighted the significance of familial and community support in
developing high intellectual self-esteem which, in turn, allowed them to benefit from the
flip side of bias and reap the benefits of positive stereotyping. Describing the reaction of
his family to his decision to attend law school, one informant noted, “Oh, [they were]
very proud. To have a kid go to Yale was beyond their dreams. So, there was nothing but
great support. Not that they could afford anything, but they . . . approved heartily. And
you know, it worked out well for me afterwards.”221 Another reinforced the idea of strong
cultural and familial support:

I was fifteen . . . [and] the career paths, I think . . . probably would have been either
the rabbinate or law. And just sort of looking around, I thought the law was the
more socially promoting, reinforcing kind of position. . . . The family was certainly
supportive of me. I think at the time that I started law school, my father was either
changing businesses or whatever it was, and at that time I even got a partial stipend
or scholarship from Columbia Law, because it was something of a financial
difficulty. . . . I cannot remember what I would call a serious discussion or even
dispute over a career choice. 222

Finally, another informant noted the importance of an upbringing in a cultural
commitment to education to the development of cultural capital, stating, “The opposition
[to law school] was only to the extent that people didn't think that you should be pursuing
220
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secular careers at all. Even in those days, there were rabbis that would have preferred that
I would have stayed on.” 223
The stereotype of Jewish attorneys as learned experts, now a desirable quality under
the new more competitive professional paradigm, was, according to the informants,
consistent with their actual backgrounds. Describing his hobbies and interests as a child,
one informant recalled:

If you mean before I was four and a half, there were no hobbies . . . [I was] taught
to read, to ‘study,’ to pray, to carry out religious ritual and to count simple
arithmetical
operations . . . [growing up] I essentially had a five and a half day week; the day
was from 8:45 to 6:30, Sunday through Thursday, and 9 to 12 Friday. 224

Education took clear precedent over work. The same informant remembered,
“Mostly, there was no time to work, because we did not work on the Sabbath and on
Sunday I was at school all day. There was no real opportunity to work.” 225 Further, “I
never learned to do things with my hands. I, too, did not learn to do anything menial until
I went out on my own, and had to learn to wash dishes and make beds.” 226 The account is
revealing exactly because the informant hailed from a poor socio-economic background.
Not learning to make his bed was not an indication of a privileged background, rather, it
was a reflection of commitment and devotion to learning and the intellectual over the
mundane.
Another explained that he grew up in a culture in which commitment to education
was a foregone conclusion, and graduate school was a default choice when one did not
know what to do after college. When asked why he went to law school, the informant
responded:
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I have no good answer for you. I'm not so sure that I knew what I was going to do
as I went into my last year of college. I really had not pulled up my sleeves . . . But
what happened was, I took the law school boards and I did very, very well. I can't
say I stayed up nights, that I was going to save the world. 227

Finally, commenting on the powerful interplay of commitment to education within
the Jewish community and high intellectual self-esteem exhibited by Jewish lawyers, one
informant jokingly noted:

It seems you have to be an ordained rabbi now to get on the law review. But the
reason why, is because we [observant Jews] actually, I think, have an edge. As
people were getting used to abstract thinking, and for legal reasoning, this was
something that we had all done for a very long time . . . the basis, so much of the
basis of law and civil law, whether it's, you know, torts or property law, is derived
from the Judaic system and the problem, I think, with the whole method of
reasoning and thinking [is] that it is so familiar to us. And [since selection to law
review is] based on your first year's performance, I frankly think we had an unfair
advantage. 228
The “flip side of bias” phenomenon helped build the Jewish law firm's reputation.
Under the new business model of professionalism, the thin religious identity of the
Jewish firm—the product of the religious identity of its lawyers—served as a selling
point to its clients. “But it may reflect a tendency that I've heard said rightly or wrongly
about the stereotype of Jewish lawyers that they're always pushing to get ahead,” said one
informant. “If you're pushing to get ahead, you're focusing on what you need to get
ahead.”229
While the Jewish firms never cultivated an explicitly Jewish culture of legal
practice, their perceived religious identity, one which “flipped bias” rendered desirable,
arguably made law firms with a majority of Jewish lawyers more attractive to entity
clients and, ironically, enabled Jewish law firms to actually benefit from bias and
prejudice. An informant confirmed this perceived identity, stating:
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You have to understand that most of this is a perception . . . [It] is important to be
seen by litigators because, how many people have ever seen me in court? That's
how you get a reputation. You get a reputation by being seen with litigators. Just
tell your clients, your students this one thing: it's a perception. 230

VII. Conclusion

The interplay of diminished religious-based discrimination and increased client
demand for corporate legal services provides the backdrop for the incredible s uccess
story of the Jewish law firm in New York City. The chapter identifies several factors,
however, that combined to help explain the emergence and unique growth of the Jewish
firm: the rise of inside counsel as decision- makers within large corporate entities
regarding the engagement of outside counsel replacing discriminating executives; the
emergence of Jewish firms at a time when individual visibility of superstar attorneys was
still feasible and played a significant role in the building of firm-wide reputations; and
the existence of a Jewish client base consisting of a large number of smaller e ntities. All
of these factors, operating in the shadow of diminished anti-Semitism and religious-based
discrimination, enabled the growth of Jewish firms.
Moreover, the relatively small number and size of the old WASP firms; their refusal
to compete with the Jewish firms over the provision of “undignified” legal services, such
as real-estate, bankruptcy and hostile takeovers, resulting in the de facto crea tion of
Jewish pockets of practice in which the Jewish firms could prove their expertise and from
which they crossed over to more “dignified” practice areas; effective discriminatory
hiring and promotion practices by the old WASP firms against Jewish attor neys, which
created a pool of talented entry-level and lateral Jewish lawyers from which Jewish law
firms could cherry-pick; and the “flip side of bias” phenomenon all explain the unique
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growth of Jewish law firms at a rate far exceeding that of the WASP firms.
Current practice realities in New York City and throughout the United States have
changed significantly. 231 The informants suggest that Jewish lawyers presently face little
to no systematic ethno-religious-based discrimination. 232 For instance, one informant
noted, “There's no suggestion of anti-Semitism at the bar in New York . . . [Outside of
New York City,] I don't know. I wouldn't like to try a case in Texas. Not because I'm
Jewish, but because you can get home-towned.” 233 Another opined: “You sort of had no
choice, even if at your heart you were racist. You had to understand that the economics of
the business could no longer support your racism.”234 One informant noted the current
level of religious tolerance and accommodation afforded to Jewish attorneys.235
Moreover, to the extent it currently persists, religious discrimination reflects the opinions
of the older generation within large firms. As one informant stated:

I think that when you look at what we would call the very established white-shoe
firms, in many of their firms there really is what might be described as the old firm
and the new firm . . . I remember I had a case, I tried a case . . . and one of the
231

While large law firm systematic ethno-religious discrimination against Jews and Catholics is a thing of
the past, some previously excluded groups still face significant hurdles and others experience implicit
discrimination. On the glass -ceiling effect experienced by many wo men lawyers at large law firms see
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., “Class Ceilings and Open Doors: Women’s Advancement in the Legal
Profession,” Fordham Law Review 64 (1995): 291– 449; Deborah L. Rhode, “The ‘No-Problem’ Problem:
Femin ist Challenges and Cultural Change,” Yale Law Journal 100 (1991); 1731– 93; Wald, “Glass Ceilings
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in some firms, I don't know. I suspect it probably would. Here it does n't, but we're not a usual firm”
(Informant #1, 12). Another noted: “It's true that Jews today are not suffering heavily the way it had been
50– 60 years ago when firms as a practical matter did not hire Jews . . . it would be naive to think that
[currently] there are not ele ments of prejudice and discrimination but its level is a lot less than it was”
(Informant #10, 9).
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Informant #15, 4-5. The informant further co mmented:
I think that culturally this firm [an old white-shoe firm] has been a super-meritocracy because
really we only care about one thing, which is, talent. And if you do a good job, then nothing else
matters and, in fact, the courtesy [to observant Jewish attorneys] is pretty overwhelming . . . the
whole thing has changed and the courtesy has been absolutely overwhelming . . . And I think it
really has to do with the fact that it's a meritocracy and a business that is very, so to speak, color
blind (ibid.).

important witnesses in that case was a member of the board, who was a [senior]
partner [at an old white-shoe firm]. I think it's fair to say that he had not covered
himself in the handling of this situation. And I mentioned [to another partner at that
firm] that I'd had [contact] with this particular partner and the reaction was, “Well,
you have to understand, he's part of the old firm, he's not part of the new firm.” 236

Consequently, as old WASP firms hire and promote Jewish lawyers, and as Jewish
firms hire and promote non-Jews, the Jewish firms, which never developed a distinctive
professional Jewish culture, are losing their Jewish identity:

Our law firm is hardly a Jewish law firm anymore . . . we have offices all over the
world in Germany and [China] and . . . and you can be sure the people working for
us in Germany and [China] aren't Jewish, they are whoever they are and whatever
they are is fine. So the firm, our firm, has expanded into the pluralistic world. 237

That is, since the Jewish firms were Jewish only by discriminatory default, they
gradually lose their Jewishness as they hire and promote non-Jews. An informant
affirmed this fact, stating, “There were a number of non-Jewish, and today I would say it
was a mixed firm. Largely, I don't know if it's fifty- fifty or two thirds/one third but very,
very significant people in the firm are non-Jewish.” 238 Similarly, a partner at a nonJewish firm described the composition of his firm as follows: “You know, the proportion
now is probably, if I had to guess, I would say, a third to forty percent of the partners are
Jewish, a third to forty percent [are] Catholic, and a third [are an]other [religious
affiliation].” 239
Indeed, contemporary practice realities in New York City nearly render the old
divide among large law firms meaningless. One informant noted :

My favorite story [is] about [a particular old WASP firm], where a [a Jewish
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partner] I know, was head of the tax department. He and I were negotiating part of
that deal that you see all bound in volumes. We had a whole group on the phone . . .
He was trying to persuade me to do something in a different format. He says, “Look
. . . you have to pay the tax [using a Yiddish phrase]. ” There was absolute silence,
and I said, “Look guys, it's all right. I'll explain it to you.” But to me, that one
telephone conference call represented how far we had come from 1960 to the year
2000 . . . or . . . 1998. That year he was—and I was—we were both very
comfortable, and could talk in that language. So, it was within a lifetime, it was a
big step forward. 240

And another informant commented:

Our [Jewish] firm has expanded into the pluralistic world and the white-shoe firms
have expanded into the pluralistic world, and we had a very funny experience
because, at one point, we were talking to [a particular old WASP firm] about doing
an arrangement together and [the old WASP firm], which really used to be one of
the white-shoe law firms, sent their executive committee over to meet with our
executive committee. Their executive committee was all Jewish, our executive
committee was all Christian, and we commented on the fact that the world had
really changed. And it has, it has. This is really astonishing. 241

As Jewish firms decline, has something of value been lost? The informants suggest
that Jewish law firms were created because of discriminatory practice realities, and the
decline of religious-based discrimination should lead to the decline of “Jewish” firms.
One informant pointed out:

From having dichotomized law firms, Jewish and un-Jewish . . . did you make a
virtue out of a vice? The vice was anti-Semitism. The virtue was [that] there were
some firms who took a few Jews. . . . The point is, it's like saying, “We'll put you in
a concentration camp, but we'll be better, we'll give you bread . . . [and] put you out
of the system.” So, somebody came to the rescue of a few people. There's no virtue;
that's the point. 242

Others echo the sentiment, suggesting that because Jewish law firms were Jewish
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Informant #4, 15.
Informant #21, 7– 8. Informants at old wh ite-shoe firms similarly described contemporary realit ies. For
example, one informant opined, “At most of the large pro fessional [law] firms it is true today that [one's
religious identity does not constitute a barrier ] and clearly it was a different situation back in the 50's and
60's, and after I became an associate here [a white-shoe firm] and they admitted their first Jewish partner,
that alleviated the situation somewhat and over the years that's changed quite a bit” (Informant #19, 5– 6).
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Informant #8, 15– 16.
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only by discriminatory default, such firms will disappear as Jewish attorneys become less
and less religious. 243 In fact, one informant stated:

I tend to believe that Jewish lawyers compartmentalize their [Jewishness] from the
standpoint of law—they're as hungry as everybody else. What is good for their
education, what is good for their practice . . . ? Maybe it shows the narrowness in
terms of Jewish lawyers. Don't misunderstand me, they may go to a lecture [about
Judaism] . . . or something . . . [and] they'll jump in and what not, but as a regular
course, it's a luxury. 244

The rise and growth of large Jewish law firms in the second half of the twentieth
century is a remarkable success story of overcoming discrimination in the legal
profession. Paradoxically, part of the very success of the Jewish firms is reflected in their
demise by the early twenty- first century: because systematic large law firm ethnoreligious discrimination against Jewish lawyers has become a thing of the past, the very
reason for the existence of Jewish law firms has been nullified. As other minority
groups, however, continue to struggle for equality within the profession’s elite large law
firms, can the experience of the Jewish firms serve as a “separate-but-equal” blueprint for
overcoming contemporary forms of discrimination for women, racial, and ethnic minority
attorneys?
Perhaps not. As this chapter establishes, the success of large Jewish law firms was
the result of the coming together of numerous conditions and circumstances between
1945 and 1980, from the general decline of ethno-religious discrimination in American
society and increased demand for corporate legal services; to the unique structure of the
market for elite corporate legal services including the relatively small number and size of
243

See, generally, Alan M. Dershowit z, The Vanishing American Jew: In Search of Jewish Identity for the
Next Century (Boston: Little Brown, 1997) (raising the possibility that, over time, a majority of lawyers in
all large law firms will be Christian, if only due to the decline of the number of Jews in A merica and the
corresponding decline in the nu mber of Jewish lawyers). At the same time, with the increased
secularizat ion among American professionals, it is equally possible that, to borrow fro m Dershowit z, the
vanishing religious lawyer wou ld render the question of the religious identity of the large law firm
mean ingless.
244
Informant #10, 29.

large firms, their anti-competitive conduct, including staying out of undignified practice
areas such as real-estate hostile takeovers, bankruptcy and even litigation allowing
Jewish firms to establish themselves in these pockets of practice and the cross over to
more dignified legal arenas, WASP firms’ traditional and die-hard organizational habits
and their discriminatory hiring and promotion practices; the rise of in- house counsel; the
affinity of Jews to American law and the legal profession resulting in their flocking to
law schools notwithstanding grim job prospects; and the flip side of bias phenomenon
that has elevated the status and perception of Jewish lawyers as the dominant ideology of
large law firms became more competitive and meritocratic. Such a unique combination of
conditions and circumstances may never be replicated again.
To be clear, some of these conditions apply to some minority lawyers, for example,
Joan Williams has opined that women lawyers may benefit from the flip side of bias as
in- house counsel departments increasingly value stereotypically feminine qualities such
as cooperative styles of practice and being a team player. 245 But other key conditions are
absent, for example, large law firms have become hyper-competitive and are unlikely to
allow any newcomers the benefit of protected pockets of practice. As importantly, even
if “separate-but-equal” styled law firms could succeed, the desirability of combating
inequality by resorting to “separate-but-equal” institutions is likely to be a complex and
controversial issue. Jewish lawyers, after all, did not choose to practice in Jewish law
firms, they were forced into them by explicitly discriminatory practice realities. While
implicit discrimination is still rampant in BigLaw, many minority lawyers today do have
a choice to enter these institutions and some choose to do so hoping that equality can be
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Michelle Coleman Mayes and Kara Sophia Baysinger, Courageous Counsel – Conversations with
Women General Counsel in the Fortune 500 (Leverage Media, 2011), 31 (quoting Joan Williams: “wo men
have traditionally been under the pressure of not putting themselves ahead in the packing order, but rather,
assuming a more attentive, helpful, emotionally intelligent role. These are the sort of things they were
expected to do, but now, these same qualities are seen as being very effective for co rporate legal
leadership.”).

achieved by and from within large law firms rather than forced upon them by “separatebut-equal” competitors. Assuming other minority lawyers may choose to practice in
“separate-but-equal” large law firms if such entities existed, would such institutions be
desirable in a “post-gendered,” “post-racial” America? 246
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See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Why Women Still Can’t Have It All,” The Atlantic (July-Aug. 2012),
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/ magazine/archive/2012/07/why -wo men-still-cant-have-itall/ 309020/; Shery l Sandberg, Lean In : Women, Work, and the Will to Lead (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2013); Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, Acting White? Rethinking Race in “Post-Racial” America
(Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013).

VIII. Appendix
I interviewed twenty-two male Jewish lawyers who graduated from law school
between 1945 and 1962, either joined a large New York City firm, WASP, Jewish, or
mixed, or established their own, and practiced in New York City throughout their
respective careers. 247 I began by identifying a universe that consisted of the nineteen
largest law firms in New York City in 1963, 248 and excluded from the list one law firm
that dissolved. 249
In particular, the study benefited from the assistance of two knowledgeable sources—
a New York City law professor who is an advisor to the Center for Jewish History in
New York and a New York City law professor who is the director of a program in Jewish
law and interdisciplinary studies. These informants were knowledgeable with respect to
the experience of the Jewish lawyers who were the object of my inquiry and familiar with
the history of New York City Jewish law firms. These sources were asked to review the
list of large firms and suggest other New York City firms of which they were aware that
were either a white-shoe firm, a Jewish law firm, or a mixed law firm. They confirmed
that the list of large law firms included all the firms that are traditionally considered
white-shoe firms. Based on their advice, I added to the list three law firms, two Jewish
firms and one mixed firm, founded in the late 1960s, but after 1963. The final list of
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Lateral lawyer movement between 1945 and 1962 was uncommon. See Eli Wald, “Lawyer Mobility and
Legal Ethics: Resolving the Tension between Confidentiality and Contemporary Lawyers' Career Paths,”
Journal of the Legal Profession 31 (2007): 199. A majority of the interviewees jo ined a law firm and have
practiced with it ever since. So me interviewees did leave their respective firms to assume public positions
and returned to the firms thereafter.
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Large New York City law firms experienced steady growth between 1945 and 1965. While the internal
ranking with in the largest nineteen firms changed, the list itself was stable. The firms in the init ial list were,
in order of their size: Shearman & Sterling; White & Case; Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Dewey, Ballantine;
Milbank, Tweed; Sullivan & Cro mwell; Davis, Po lk; Simpson, Thatcher & Bart lett; Cahill, Gordon; Kaye,
Scholer; Pau l, Weiss, Cleary, Gottlieb; Cad walader; Donovan, Leisure; Rogers & Wells; Fried Frank; Weil
Gotshal; Coudert Brothers; and Skadden, Arps. The largest law firm, Shearman & Sterling, had 134
attorneys, and the smallest, Skadden, Arps, had ten attorneys. Remarkab ly, the same firms were the largest
law firms in New York City in 1981, although the internal ranking within the list changed. See above,
Table 2.
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Coudert Brothers dissolved in 2005. See Ellen Rosen, “The Co mplicated End of an Ex-Law Firm,” N .Y.
Times, Feb, 9, 2007, C7.

firms consisted of twenty-one of the largest firms in New York City.
My unit of analysis was the Jewish male lawyer who graduated from law school
between 1945 and 1962 and was interested in joining a large New York City law firm. 250
My focus in the study was the attorney's interest and decision to apply to law school, his
law school experience, his experience with the large law firm job market after law school,
and his career path (for example, attempting to join a white-shoe firm as opposed to
joining or founding a Jewish firm). I wanted to study the ways and the extent, if any, that
ethnic and religious-based considerations played a role or were perceived to have played
a role in the career of the attorney, and in his understanding and perception of the
organization of the large firm. The purposive universe was limited to partners who have
remained with their respective firms and thus experienced not only hiring and promotion
with the firm, but also had the perspective of long tenure and the opportunity to observe
changes in the firm’s employment practices, if any, over time. 251 From December 2004
through July 2005, I conducted twenty-two semi-structured interviews, which were all
taped and transcribed verbatim. Page numbers in the informants’ citations in this chapter
refer to the pages of the transcribed interviews. I spoke with twenty partners at fourteen
large law firms. On three occasions, I interviewed more than one partner from a firm,
and, thus, I was able to corroborate much of the information. 252 I also spoke with two
former partners at two additional law firms who currently hold public office. The
respondents were told that their identity would be kept confidential.
Within the list of law firms, I contacted respondents by snowball sampling. After
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The number o f female attorneys who graduated from law school between 1945 and 1962, jo ined a large
New York City firm, and continued to practice with the firm, was very low, and I decided to exclude them
fro m the universe. Furthermo re, I was interested in studying ethnic and relig ious -based discrimination and
decided to avoid the separate and important question of gender discrimination. See generally Chambliss,
“Organizational Determinants,” 739–40 (asserting that the common tendency to treat women and racial
minorities as a single undifferentiated group is misguided).
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While it would have enriched the study to have the perspective of attorneys from all law firms on the
list, time and resource constraints did not allow fo r this.
252
Interviewing a second partner at a firm was possible when more than one partner met the criteria:
graduation from law school between 1945 and 1962 and continuous practice with the firm.

interviewing a partner, I asked him for a list of partners at other firms who would be the
most knowledgeable about the experience of the cohort of Jewish lawyers I was studying.
I contacted the referrals and continued the process. Snowball sampling can introduce bias
into a study in that the sample firms and the respondents within the firms may not be
representative of the universe, but rather of a selected group or network within a universe.
These potential biases are always a concern.
In this case, I believe bias through snowball sampling is less of a concern. The
purpose of the present chapter is not to generalize to a broad universe, but to explore
ideas and perceptions about the growth of Jewish law firms in New York City. The
qualitative interviews provided in-depth descriptions of the experiences of these lawyers
and law firms. It is important to remember that the number of all large New York City
law firms was small. 253 Furthermore, within the list of law firms, the universe of study
was restricted to Jewish male lawyers who graduated from law school between 1945 and
1962 and were still practicing with their respective firms. Within that small universe, my
sample was relatively large, consisting of twenty-two interviews and sixteen law firms. 254
Finally, in exploring the experience of Jewish male lawyers attempting to break into the
large law firm sphere between 1945 and 1962, I was interested in the possibility of the
existence of a network that possibly facilitated the effort. In any event, I contacted every
candidate for interview identified by my snowball sampling.
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The universe consisted of twenty-one law firms. The n ineteenth “largest” firm in the universe had ten
attorneys in 1963.
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Snowball sampling resulted in a fairly robust list of twenty -four candidates for interv iews. I contacted
all twenty-four attorneys referenced by my interviewees. Two declined to participate in the study.

